關於 legco election中文 ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

【關於解釋國際攬炒：與外媒記者交流的工作日常】

早排同位識睇中文既日本記者食飯做訪問，佢做做下訪問期間，竟然拎左我個幾月前寫 #國際攬炒，差唔多成兩、三千字既長文出嚟，仲要自己用原字筆間曬部份佢覺得緊要既重點，見到嗰下真係覺得不得了。

呢一年以嚟，採訪同跟進香港情況既外國記者好多，當然各人認知程度都有唔同程度既差別，記得最經典係有位中歐本身唔太熟悉香港既記者問我「當選立法會議員後有咩感受」，當刻又真係有啲無奈…

點都好，國際攬炒同埋反制「臨立會 2.0」，唔好講話國際社會，就算本地都未必好明白當中較複雜既來龍去脈，感謝呢位記者之餘，我都未來都會同眾志團隊繼續努力，同各國政界官員傳媒交流時，準確分析香港抗爭形勢。

最後，如果大家早排未睇過既話，都歡迎大家重溫兩篇我寫過既文章（雖然我都知真係好長）：

【破局：立會過半 = 香港光已復？】
https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

【議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」】 https://www.facebook.com/200976479994868/posts/2887651214660701/

-----------------------------------------

A possible scenario will be like: Beijing will dissolve the existing LegCo and disqualify all 70 lawmakers once pro-democracy camps win the majority. One of the reference points is the recent statement by China’s office on Hong Kong Affairs, HKMAO.

The office unprecedentedly accused pro-democracy lawmakers of violating LegCo oaths when they use procedural tactics to block the controversial national anthem and national security legislation. In the eyes of Beijing, LegCo can only serve as a rubber stamp; otherwise, councillors fail to "show their allegiance to the central governments” and "serve dutifully” as the oath states. In other words, HKMAO is paving the way for a large-scaled disqualification before and after the election.

After the dissolution, Beijing will probably set up a pseudo-legislature and directly appoint all the members. That is not a crazy imagination since Beijing has done once in 1997. At that time, after pro-democracy forces won a majority during 1995-1997, Beijing set up a Provisional LegCo, directly appointed members and held meetings in Shenzhen. Therefore, history may repeat.

However, Hongkongers will still strive for a parliamentary majority since Beijing has already put its most controversial agenda, the national security legislation, on the table. The parliamentary majority is the only way for us to block this evil law.

If, at the end, Beijing really dissolves the LegCo and disqualifies all elected lawmakers, it means Beijing is shutting down all peaceful mechanism to resolve political problems and grievance. More importantly, this move will put the so-called promised autonomy under the One Country Two Systems formula to the test.

When even the legislature is a rubber stamp, it Is doubtful whether Hong Kong can still maintain its special status as an independent tariff zone. The latter will carry significant implications for international investors. On the street level, it is foreseeable that more protests will erupt, especially when Beijing starts to disqualify all pro-democracy candidates before the election.

https://twitter.com/joshuawongcf/status/1262645433337122816

【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw

我到美國接受了星島中文電台的訪問，當中談及了公民抗命、DQ事件、民主自決等等，最後節目被改名（刪去了「民主自決」的字眼），甚至被下架。自今，星島中文電台仍未有解釋原因。

節目內容和編排，包括解釋民主自決的理念，也是電台一方建議的。如果星島因為政治敏感而將節目下架，為何當初要如此建議？再者，每個人也有談及自己政治主張的權利和自由，也有權不同意或作出批評，作為媒體，何必如此懼怕，要自我審查？

星島中文電台必須盡快清楚解釋，及把節目重新上載網頁，我們需要的是媒體，不是政權的喉舌。

(中文版本在英文版本下方)
==== Press Release: A protest against political censorship by Sing Tao Chinese Radio (AM1400) ====

Agnes Chow 周庭, who was disqualified in the Hong Kong LegCo by-election in January this year, was invited by Stanford Hong Kong Student Association to attend the Cantonese Awareness Week in mid April. Northern California Hong Kong Club had coordinated with the hosts of a current affairs talk show 焦點訪談 of Sing Tao Chinese Radio (AM1400) to arrange Agnes Chow and another ex-Scholarism member appearing in the 4/17 (Tuesday) show.

Everything went smoothly and there were good interaction among the host, the guests and the audience. As usual, the program recording was archived in the show web site (http://www.chineseradio.com/…/%E7%AF%80%E7%9B%AE…/cm-f09-10/) in the same afternoon.

Alerted by a friend, however, we noticed that the recording of this particular episode has gone through sequences of editing and censorship afterward.

1) The title of the episode has changed from "04/17/2018 香港眾志常委周庭闡述香港自決主張" to "04/17/2018 訪問香港眾志常委周庭".

2) Starting from 4/19 (Thu) afternoon or earlier, the link of this episode no longer works while all other older and newer episodes work just fine. (See the attached screen capture: singtao_0421.png.)

In fact, we found out only the MP3 file of this episode (http://archive.chineseradio.com/Archive/C20180417_09-10.mp3) is removed or renamed. The episode one day before (http://archive.chineseradio.com/Archive/C20180416_09-10.mp3) and one day after (http://archive.chineseradio.com/Archive/C20180418_09-10.mp3) are still accessible.

3) We notified the host on 4/19 (Thu) about this issue. Later on, we filed a formal complaint through its official contacts with email and online message board. Not only do we not get any official response, but the operation to block this episode also seems to step up.

4) Starting from 4/23 (Mon) afternoon or earlier, even the web page of the whole talk show archive is removed (screen capture: singtao_0423.png) and a new archive page is created (screen capture: singtao_0424.png). In this new page, however, the 4/17 episode disappears and all other episodes have no title. Besides, this talk show is missing in the archive page of all cantonese programs (screen capture: singtao_cantonese_0424.png). All these appear to be a cover-up for the removal of the episode involing Agnes Chow.

So far, we do not receive any official explanation. Based on the sequences of events, the only logical conclusion is that the blocking is an intended political censorship and not a technical error.

Let us be clear that we had had good working relationship with the hosts in the past. We appreciated their openness and professionalism to invite different spectrum of view points to their program.

We suspect this post-censorship is an intervention from the senior management of the Sing Tao Group, as the political leaning of the owner and the editor in chief of the Sing Tao Group is well known.

We have to ask the Sing Tao senior management:
- Why are you so afraid of a 21-year-old activist has to say?
- The director of HK ETO in San Francisco was willing to attend the panel discussion in Stanford on the very same day (4/17) to debate Agnes Chow head on. Where is your courage?

Although the majority of the mass media in Hong Kong has been influenced directly or indirectly by mainland China or pro-establishment interest, it is a whole different matter when such political censorship happens in the United States. According to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, an organization and persons have to disclose the related activities and finances if they act "at the order, request, or under the direction or control" of a foreign power. As such, we would like to remind our media friends in the United States about the potential consequence of your action.

Northern California Hong Kong Club
2017-04-24

[Background information]
梁建鋒 (Editor in Chief of Sing Tao Group): 百無小政客
https://www.singtaousa.com/…/481534-%E7%99%BE%E7%84%A1%E5%…/

维基百科: 何柱國 (Owner of Sing Tao Group)
https://zh.wikipedia.org/…/%E4%BD%95%E6%9F%B1%E5%9C%8B_(%E5…

Foreign Agents Registration Act
https://en.wikipedia.org/wi…/Foreign_Agents_Registration_Act
_________________________________________________
==== 4月17日是怎樣被星島中文電台消失的 ====

今年一月在香港立法會補選中被奪去參選資格的香港眾志常委周庭，應史丹福大學香港同學會的邀請，到訪灣區參加四月中旬的廣東話週。北加洲香港會協調安排了周庭與另一位前學民思潮成員，於4月17日（星期二）在星島中文電台（AM1400）「焦點訪談」節目中接受現場訪問。

訪問過程順利，主持人、來賓和聽眾互動良好。當日節目重温一如既往，當天下午即存檔在節目網站（http://www.chineseradio.com/…/%E7%AF%80%E7%9B%AE…/cm-f09-10/）。

然而，一位朋友稍後注意到當曰節目重温連結出現了問題，她把這事情告知我們。我們開始跟進，發現該連結經過一系列的編輯和疑似審查：

1）當日節目重温標題，由原先的“04/17/2018 香港眾志常委周庭闡述香港自決主張”，後被改為“04/17/2018 訪問香港眾志常委周庭”。

2）從4月19日（星期四）下午或更早的時候開始， 當日節目重温連結失效，然而所有其他較新或較舊的節目重温連結仍正常工作。（參閱屏幕截圖：singtao_0421.png）

我們發現只有這一集的MP3語音文件（http://archive.chineseradio.com/Archive/C20180417_09-10.mp3）被刪除或重新命名。 之前一天（http://archive.chineseradio.com/Archive/C20180416_09-10.mp3）和之後的一天（http://archive.chineseradio.com/Archive/C20180418_09-10.mp3）的文件則完好無缺。

3）4月19日（星期四）下午，我們通知星島中文電台主持人有關事宜。之後我們再依正式途徑，用電郵和網上留言投訴。我們不但沒有得到回覆，星島對該節目的屏閉動作反而更進一步。

4）從4月23日（週一）下午或更早的時候開始，整個「焦點訪談」節目的原有重温網頁亦被删除（參閱屏幕截圖：singtao_0423.png），而新建了一個重温網頁（參閱屏幕截圖：singtao_0424.png）。在這個新的網頁中，4月17日消失了，而其他日子亦沒有題目。另外在羅列所有粤語節目的網頁中 (singtao_cantonese_0424.png)，「焦點訪談」亦不見了。種種動作，似乎是對周庭訪問重温被消失作掩飾。

到目前為止，我們沒有收到星島中文電台的任何解釋。根據事件的發展時序，唯一合乎邏輯的結論是，封鎖是有意的政治審查，而不是技術上的錯誤。

我們一直與「焦點訪談」節目主持人有著良好的工作關係。我們讚賞他們以專業及開放的態度，邀請不同的觀點的來賓到他們的節目發表言論。

我們認為這次審查是源於管理高層的介入，星島集團主席和總編輯的政治傾向是眾所周知的。

我們必須問星島集團管理高層：
- 為什麼你們如此害怕一個21歲的年青人的言論？
- 舊金山香港經貿辦主任，就在同一天（4月17日）願意出席史丹福大學的香港問題討論會，面對面與周庭同場討論。為何你們沒有這個勇氣？

儘管香港傳媒近年常因中國大陸或親建制勢力的影響，而直接或間接的進行政治審查。但要在美國進行這樣的政治審查，則要面對一種完全不一樣的環境。根據美國“外國代理人註冊法”，如果一個組織和個人，在外國勢力的指揮或控制下行事，他們必須披露相關活動和財務聯繫。我們想提醒身在美國的媒體朋友，注意你們的行為可能引起的後果。

北加州香港會
2017年4月24日