關於 middle school curriculum ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

轉載Chenchen Chen fb
🛠《大家來找碴welcome strict proofreader 》

看到Christopher Chen附在獨立觀察的連結，披露日本記者黑木亮著手調查東京知事小池百合子的埃及開羅大學學歴史，所以整理了文章一半的中英對照如下，另外一半預期周末整理好再另外貼新版。

大家可以比較東京知事和她的大貴人(埃及前副首相Dr Hatem)如何促使她主張她1976年確從埃及開羅大學畢業的做法。台灣媒體不敢報導此日本疑似假學歷的新聞，倒是刷了很多東京知事抗疫好棒棒的中文報導－想必是要洗嬰粉的腦「會做事就好了，學歷有什麼重要」哈哈😄⋯⋯

✳️原文連結： https://jbpress.ismedia.jp/articles/-/60643

🔥偽造大學學位的指控困擾東京都知事小池百合子（Vol.4）
Allegations of fake university degree haunt Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike (vol.4)

💥自從現任東京都知事小池百合子（Yuriko Koike）於1992年成為國會議員以來，一直有謠言流傳稱，小池百合子（Koike）文飾美化她的學歷。
Ever since the incumbent Governor of Tokyo, Yuriko Koike became a Member of Parliament in 1992, rumors have been circulating that Koike embellished her academic credentials.

小池聲稱自己曾自開羅大學畢業，但是如果以阿拉伯語為母語的人去聽她的阿拉伯語，那麼她公開身為開羅大學畢業生的學歷，似乎就顯得更加可疑了。
Koike claims to have graduated from Cairo University but if an Arabic speaker listens to her Arabic, her published academic credentials as a Cairo University graduate seems more than dubious.

[我有]強有力的證據可以證明她偽造學歷，例如由室友提供的證詞－有紀錄片可查的證詞；小池的自相矛盾的說法表明，儘管第一年不及格，她仍然在四年之內畢業，她的初階程度阿拉伯語，以及關於畢業論文的謊言，和她拒絕向東京都議會提交畢業文件的頑強行為。
There are strong evidence about her fake academic credentials such as testimony by the flatmate supported by documentary evidence, Koike's self-contradictory statement in her book to have graduated in four years despite failing her first year, her rudimentary Arabic, her lie about the graduation thesis and her stubbornness in refusing to submit her graduation documents to the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly.

身為一個通曉阿拉伯語並從埃及大學（開羅美國大學的中東研究專業）畢業的人，我自有一種任務感，因此我決定對這些指控進行調查。 經過兩年的調查，我找不到任何證據，甚至沒有一絲一毫的最低線索，可以證明小池是從開羅大學畢業的。
Feeling a sense of duty as someone who learnt Arabic and graduated from an Egyptian university (MA, Middle East Studies from the American University in Cairo), I decided to investigate the allegations. After two years of investigation, I could not find any evidence, nor even the slightest hint that Koike graduated from Cairo University.

在這個共由六大部組成的文章中，我詳細介紹了我的調查結果。這裡是第四部的內容：
In this six-part article, I present the results of my investigation in detail.Here is the fourth part of it;

💥小池有符合[埃及大學]轉學資格嗎？
Was Koike eligible to transfer?

"小池在她的書中和其他地方聲稱，她於1972年10月開學以一年級（新鮮人）生身分進入開羅大學。
Koike claims in her books and other places that she entered Cairo University as a first year student (freshman) in October 1972.

但是，她室友在＂假簡歷”紀錄片中說：“小池是於1973年10月以二年級學生身分進入開羅大學。
However, in the ""Fake CV"" the flatmate says, ""Koike entered Cairo University in October 1973 as a second year student.

「小池高興地對我說：“我父親先請當時的哈特姆博士，當時也是埃及副首相，還兼任文化和信息部長，依據我在關西學院大學－是一間日本兵庫縣的私立大學－所上課的幾個月[學程]，加上另外在開羅美國大學的上語言課程的幾個月，一起調整合併當成是我在開羅大學就讀的第一學年[學程時間]。」
Koike happily told me ‘My father asked Dr. Hatem, then Egypt's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and Information, to swap my few months at Kwansei Gakuin University, a private university in Hyogo prefecture, and a few months at the language course at the American University in Cairo for the first year at Cairo University. ‘

「哈特姆博士接受了這一要求。此外，我的學雜費和申請費全免除了。 」
‘Dr. Hatem accepted the request. In addition, my tuition and admission fees have been waived’ .

這顯然是寫在室友1972年11月19日給她在日本母親的信中的。根據“假簡歷”該部分陳述的內容，她(室友)大部分信都附有信件日期和郵戳。 如果是這樣，他們這些人都將會被埃及法院起訴。
This is apparently written in the flatmate’s letter to her mother in Japan dated 19 November 1972. According to the ""Fake CV"" most of her letters were dated and postmarked. If so, they will be admissible to court."

呈現在“假簡歷”的內容中，含當時也正在埃及另一所大學就讀的另一名日本女性，她說，她對小池當時可以轉入開羅大學二年級就讀感到驚訝。 我(作者：黑木亮)所採訪過的另一位開羅大學的日本畢業生也記得：小池當年是[直接]轉入開羅大學二年級。
In the ""Fake CV"" another Japanese woman who was attending another university in Egypt at the time says she was surprised that Koike had transferred in the second year at Cairo University. Another Japanese graduate of Cairo University whom I interviewed also remembered that Koike had transferred to the second year."

然而，轉學到包括開羅大學在內的埃及國立大學訂有嚴格的規定。為了進行轉學，學生必須在另一所大學獲得與埃及國立大學課程相同或相似的內容和學習時數的學分，並且必須獲得一定程度的成績。 開羅大學轉學中心辦公室向我證實了這一點。
However, strict rules are in place to transfer to Egypt's state universities, including Cairo University. In order to transfer, a student must have earned credits at another university with the same or similar content and number of hours as the Egyptian state university’s curriculum and must have earned a certain number of grades. This was confirmed to me by the Central Transfers Office of Cairo University.

例如，在2016-17學年，如果學生希望：
－轉學到工程或醫學學院，則必須從其他大學獲得至少imtiyaaz（優秀）成績。
－轉學實務研究學院，則必須從其他大學獲得至少jaiid jiddab(非常好)的成績。
－轉學理論學習研究學院，則必須從其他大學獲得至少jaiid (好)的成績。
In the case of the 2016-17 academic year, for example, students are required to have at least imtiyaaz (excellent) grade from other university if the student wishes to transfer to the Faculty of Engineering or Medicine and at least jaiid jiddan (very good) grade in the case of faculties of practical study and at least jaiid (good) grade for those of theoretical study.

前面如曾經提到的記者，達莉亞·施貝爾（Dalia Shibel）這樣告訴我：“在埃及，國立大學和私立大學是兩個完全不同的系統。即使您在開羅的美國大學學習了10年並獲得了必要的學分，您還是必須從開羅(國立)大學的一年級學生重新開始。這是我國的法律”。 因此，像小池這樣沒有在另一所大學讀完一年（也沒有獲得任何學分）的人是完全不可能被核准轉學的。
The aforementioned journalist Dalia Shibel told me that ""In Egypt state universities and private universities are two completely different systems. Even if you study at the American University in Cairo for 10 years obtaining necessary credits, you have to start as a first year student in Cairo University. This is the law of our country"". Therefore it is totally impossible that a person like Koike who has not finished a year at another university (and has not earned any credits) would be allowed to transfer."

小池最多只在關西學院大學學習了幾個月。 她在開羅的美國大學CASA那裡學習阿拉伯語只是一所語言學校，不提供任何學分或學位。 如果像一些日本人指出的那樣，小池真果真是在1973年轉入開羅大學第二年級的話，那不過是欺詐性的轉學而已。 這意味著她從一開始就沒有資格畢業。
Koike only attended Kwansei Gakuin University for several months at most. CASA at the American University in Cairo where she learnt Arabic is just a language school and does not offer any credits or degrees. If, as some Japanese people point out, Koike actually transferred to the second year at Cairo University in 1973, that is nothing but a fraudulent transfer. That means she was not eligible for graduation from the beginning.

💥關於小池入學許可的問題並沒有得到答案
No answer to the question about Koike’s admittance

2019年，有51人因以慈善機構樂捐名義為幌子，賄賂美國一個組織而受到起訴，該組織通過提升名人和其他人的孩子的SAT（大學才能測驗）分數，以欺詐手段允許他們的子女因此能夠進入著名的大學。
In 2019, 51 people were prosecuted in the United States for paying bribes under the guise of charity to an organization that allows celebrities and others to increase their children's SAT (college aptitude test) scores and fraudulently admit them to prestigious universities.

其中一位女演員費利西蒂·霍夫曼（Felicity Huffman）曾出演電視劇《欲望師奶(台灣翻譯)》，被判處14天監禁，並於去年10月在加利福尼亞州的女性監獄中被監禁。 霍夫曼的女兒索菲亞（Sophia）尚未上大學，據報導他將重考SAT。
One of them, actress Felicity Huffman, who starred in the TV drama Desperate Housewives, was sentenced to 14 days in prison and was incarcerated last October in a women's prison in California. Huffman's daughter Sophia has not enrolled in college and is reported to be retaking the SAT.

斯坦福大學以’非合法入學申請’為由，開除一名中國學生，原因在於他的父母為了可以濫用體育贊助(入學)名額，使他得以註冊該校學習課程，向該(同一)組織支付了650萬美元。
Stanford University expelled a Chinese student, whose parents paid $6.5 million to the organization for misusing a sports endorsement slot to enroll in the program, citing irregularities in submissions.

由於小池似乎未達到轉學入埃及國立大學的要求，因此我致信小池，詢問小池是在1972年還是1973年被錄取，但未得到任何答复（有關我詢問的信件內容，以及小池回應的所有完整文件，將在此報告的稍後部分中顯示）。
As Koike does not appear to have fulfilled the requirements for transferring to a state university in Egypt, I sent a letter to Koike, to ask whether she was admitted in 1972 or 1973 but received no response (the full text of my questions to and response from Koike will appear later in this report).

開羅大學是阿拉伯世界著名的大學之一，醫學，工程學，經濟和政治學係有許多優秀的埃及學生。 但是，該校在全球地位並不是很高。
Cairo University is one of the prominent universities in the Arab world and there are many excellent Egyptian students in the Faculties of Medicine, Engineering, and Economics and Political Science. However, its global standing is not very high.

在英國Quacquarelli Symonds Ltd.發布的2020年QS世界大學排名中，開羅大學在全球排名521-530，在埃及排名第二，與日本的熊本大學和長崎大學相當。 埃及最好的大學是開羅的美國大學（私立和美國認可大學），在世界上排名第395（與日本神戶大學並列）。 埃及排名第三的是艾因沙姆斯大學，亞歷山大大學和阿修特大學（所有國立大學），在世界範圍內排名第801-1000。
In the 2020 edition of the QS World University Rankings published by Quacquarelli Symonds Ltd. in the United Kingdom, Cairo University ranks 521-530 in the world and second in Egypt, on par with Kumamoto University and Nagasaki University in Japan. The best university in Egypt is the American University in Cairo (private and American-accredit university) which ranks 395th in the world (tied with Kobe University in Japan). Third place in Egypt are Ain Shams University, Alexandria University, and Assiut University (all state universities) which rank 801-1000th in the world.

💥小池與Abdel-Kader Hatem博士的關係
Koike’s Connections with Dr. Abdel-Kader Hatem

協助小池進行了“可能是欺詐性轉學＂的埃及政客的名字出現在“假經歷”這部分的內容中。 這個室友證明，小池在1973年通過著名的埃及政治家阿卜杜勒·卡德爾·哈特姆博士的關係轉入開羅大學二年級。
The name of an Egyptian politician who assisted Koike's possible ""fraudulent transfer"" appears in the ""Fake CV"". The flatmate testifies that Koike transferred to the second grade at Cairo University in 1973 through the connections of Dr. Abdel- Kader Hatem, a prominent Egyptian politician."

Hatem於1917年生於亞歷山大。他畢業於軍事學院和開羅大學。 他參與了1952年的埃及革命（是一個推翻君主制的政變，次年埃及共和國成立），當時他是在由Gamal Abdel Nasser中校領導的自由軍運動中的一名年輕成員。
Hatem was born in Alexandria in 1917. A graduate of the Military Academy and Cairo University. He participated in the Egyptian revolution in 1952 (a coup to overthrow the monarchy which was followed by the foundation of the republic the following year) as a young member of the Free Officers Movement led by then Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser.

他於1957年成為國民議會議員，總統府副部長，1959年廣播電視國務部長，1962年文化部長，國家指導和旅遊部長，1971年副首相兼文化信息部長 ，曾任全國專業委員會常務理事兼埃及-日本友好協會主席。 他於2015年去世，享年97歲。
He became a member of the National Assembly in 1957, Deputy Minister in the Presidential Office, Minister of State for Radio and Television in 1959, Minister of Culture and Minister of National Guidance and Tourism in 1962, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and Information in 1971, then longtime General Supervisor of the Specialized National Councils and President of the Egyptian-Japanese Friendship Association. He died in 2015 at the age of 97.

1974年2月，當時掌控文化和信息的副首相，哈特姆，以正式外賓的身份訪問了日本，並會見了日本首相田中角榮，副首相三木武夫，並參觀了皇宮與天皇會面。 1982年，他被日本政府授予＂旭日東昇頭等大勳章”。
In February 1974, Hatem, who was then the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Culture and Information visited Japan as an official guest and met Japan’s Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki and visited the Imperial Palace to meet the Emperor. In 1982 he was awarded the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun, First Class by the Japanese government.

"在1974年Hatem訪日之際，日本駐埃及大使Tsutomu Wada在1974年2月12日給日本外交大臣的正式電報中寫道：“埃及政治的最新發展，哈特姆副首相的職位（曾擔任首相的代理者）得到了進一步鞏固，正如我經常報導的那樣，埃及副首相在6名媒體記者的陪同下訪問日本，這是非同尋常的，這清楚地表明了哈特姆博士的權力，並表明了他認為這次訪問的重要性。”
On the occasion of Hatem's visit to Japan in 1974 the Japanese Ambassador to Egypt Tsutomu Wada wrote in an official telegram dated 12 February 1974 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan ""As a result of recent developments in Egyptian politics the position of Deputy Prime Minister Hatem (who had been acting as a substitute for the Prime Minister) has been further strengthened as I have often reported. It is remarkable for an Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister to visit Japan accompanied by 6 media reporters and that clearly shows Dr. Hatem’s power. It also shows how important he thinks this visit is."""

"哈特姆的阿拉伯文傳記《阿卜杜勒·卡德·哈特姆日記-十月戰爭政府首腦》於2016年在開羅出版（由埃及記者易卜拉欣·阿卜杜勒·阿齊茲撰寫）指出，哈特姆與中曾根康弘保持著良好的關係， 自1954年起擔任日本前首相，中曾根將當時的在校學生，小池百合子－他朋友的女兒，介紹給哈特姆，哈特姆照顧小池，小池稱哈特姆為教父，並給了小池零用錢， 每月14埃及鎊。(小池在《長袖和服的金字塔攀登》第250頁上寫道，她每月從埃及政府獲得12英鎊的獎學金）。
🌐Chenchen註：Furisode是日本年輕未婚女性穿著的最正式的和服風格－以長袖為其特色，小池應是以Furisode做為自己的意象代名詞，唯美的描繪她以一介日本年輕嬌嬌女，如何在陌生的中東環境－埃及地，逐步攀登權力金字塔。中東地區非常保守，不但男尊女卑，金字塔也不容許遊客任意攀登，更何況是穿著舉步維艱的長袖正式和服，所以小池以一個浮誇的畫面來增飾自己在埃及留學生活的映象。
The Arabic-language biography of Hatem “The Diary of Abdel-Kader Hatem - Head of the October War Government"" published in Cairo in 2016 (written by an Egyptian journalist Ibrahim Abdel Aziz) states that Hatem had been on good terms with Yasuhiro Nakasone, former Prime Minister of Japan, since 1954 and that Nakasone introduced Yuriko Koike to him, a student at that time, as the daughter of his friend. Hatem took care of Koike. Koike called Hatem a god-father, and he gave Koike an allowance of 14 Egyptian pounds a month (Koike wrote on page 250 of “Furisode Climbing the Pyramid"" that she received a scholarship of 12 pounds a month from the Egyptian government)."

Abdel-Kader Hatem與中曾根康弘
Abdel-Kader Hatem with Yasuhiro Nakasone

"另一方面，小池於1985年出版的書《音譯：Onna女性 no 的Jinmyaku-Zukuri人脈建立 (（我如何以女人的身分經營人脈關係）》指出，她的父親（小池裕郎）很早就認識中曾根。她本人是在小學時代即已見到中曾根，在每個冬天，中曾根都向家人送去了一堆在中曾根選舉區群馬縣產的韭菜，並與他的兄弟一起吃了。
On the other hand Koike's book, ""Onna no Jinmyaku-Zukuri (How I made personal connections as a woman)"" published in 1985 states that her father (Yujiro Koike) had known Nakasone for a long time. She herself first met Nakasone when she was an elementary school student, every winter Nakasone sent her family a bunch of leeks produced in Gunma prefecture, Nakasone’s electoral district, and she ate them with his* brother." 🌐*Chenchen註：應該是She ate them with HER brother.,,

1973年10月6日，埃及爆發了十月戰爭（Yom Kippur War）。 埃及和敘利亞軍隊對部署在蘇伊士運河和戈蘭高地的以色列部隊發動了進攻，試圖奪回1967年六日戰爭（六月戰爭）中以色列佔領的領土。
🌐Chenchen註：這是知名的第四次以阿戰爭，後來引發第一次石油危機，各界認為這是阿拉伯國家在二戰之後，第一次聯手反對西方帝國主義。維基百科：贖罪日戰爭，又稱第四次以阿戰爭、齋月戰爭、十月戰爭...起源於埃及與敘利亞分別攻擊六年前被以色列佔領的西奈半島和戈蘭高地。戰爭的頭一至兩日埃敘聯盟佔了上風，但此後戰況逆轉。至第二周，敘軍退出戈蘭高地。在西奈，以軍在兩軍之間攻擊，越過原來的停火線蘇伊士運河。直到聯合國停火令生效為止，以軍甚至包圍了埃及的主力部隊。 https://zh.m.wikipedia.org/zh-tw/%E8%B4%96%E7%BD%AA%E6%97%A5%E6%88%B0%E7%88%AD

On 6 October 1973, the October War (Yom Kippur War) broke out in Egypt. Egyptian and Syrian forces launched an attack on Israeli forces deployed in the Suez Canal and Golan Heights in an attempt to recapture territory occupied by Israel in the Six Day War (June War) in 1967.

"為了支持埃及和敘利亞，阿拉伯石油輸出國組織（OAPEC）將石油價格提高了1.4倍，並引發了第一次石油危機。 日本被OAPEC視為“不友好”國家之一，由於採取了削減石油供應的措施，日本遭受了經濟危機。 日本政府派副首相三木武夫和前外交大臣小坂健太郎等人前往沙烏地阿拉伯，埃及和阿爾及利亞，要求這些國家將日本改變為“友好國家”類別（所謂的“石油乞討外交”）。 。
In support of Egypt and Syria, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), raised oil prices by 1.4 times and caused the First Oil Crisis. Japan was considered one of the ""unfriendly"" countries by OAPEC and suffered an economic crisis as a result of measures to cut oil supplies. The Japanese government sent Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki and former Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka and others to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Algeria to ask those countries to change Japan to a ""friendly country"" category (the so-called ""oil begging diplomacy"")."

(待續...或是直接點原文連結)
https://jbpress.ismedia.jp/articles/-/60643

泰晤士報人物專訪【Joshua Wong interview: Xi won’t win this battle, says Hong Kong activist】

Beijing believes punitive prison sentences will put an end to pro-democracy protests. It couldn’t be more wrong, the 23-year-old says.

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/joshua-wong-interview-xi-wont-win-this-battle-says-hong-kong-activist-p52wlmd0t

For Joshua Wong, activism began early and in his Hong Kong school canteen. The 13-year-old was so appalled by the bland, oily meals served for lunch at the United Christian College that he organised a petition to lobby for better fare. His precocious behaviour earned him and his parents a summons to the headmaster’s office. His mother played peacemaker, but the episode delivered a valuable message to the teenage rebel.

“It was an important lesson in political activism,” Wong concluded. “You can try as hard as you want, but until you force them to pay attention, those in power won’t listen to you.”

It was also the first stage in a remarkable journey that has transformed the bespectacled, geeky child into the globally recognised face of Hong Kong’s struggle for democracy. Wong is the most prominent international advocate for the protests that have convulsed the former British colony since last summer.

At 23, few people would have the material for a memoir. But that is certainly not a problem for Wong, whose book, #UnfreeSpeech, will be published in Britain this week.

We meet in a cafe in the Admiralty district, amid the skyscrapers of Hong Kong’s waterfront, close to the site of the most famous scenes in his decade of protest. Wong explains that he remains optimistic about his home city’s prospects in its showdown with the might of communist China under President Xi Jinping.

“It’s not enough just to be dissidents or youth activists. We really need to enter politics and make some change inside the institution,” says Wong, hinting at his own ambitions to pursue elected office.

He has been jailed twice for his activism. He could face a third stint as a result of a case now going through the courts, a possibility he treats with equanimity. “Others have been given much longer sentences,” he says. Indeed, 7,000 people have been arrested since the protests broke out some seven months ago; 1,000 of them have been charged, with many facing a sentence of as much as 10 years.

There is a widespread belief that Beijing hopes such sentences will dampen support for future protests. Wong brushes off that argument. “It’s gone too far. Who would imagine that Generation Z and the millennials would be confronting rubber bullets and teargas, and be fully engaged in politics, instead of Instagram or Snapchat? The Hong Kong government may claim the worst is over, but Hong Kong will never be peaceful as long as police violence persists.”

In Unfree Speech, Wong argues that China is not only Hong Kong’s problem (the book’s subtitle is: The Threat to Global Democracy and Why We Must Act, Now). “It is an urgent message that people need to defend their rights, against China and other authoritarians, wherever they live,” he says.

At the heart of the book are Wong’s prison writings from a summer spent behind bars in 2017. Each evening in his cell, “I sat on my hard bed and put pen to paper under dim light” to tell his story.

Wong was born in October 1996, nine months before Britain ceded control of Hong Kong to Beijing. That makes him a fire rat, the same sign of the Chinese zodiac that was celebrated on the first day of the lunar new year yesterday. Fire rats are held to be adventurous, rebellious and garrulous. Wong is a Christian and does not believe in astrology, but those personality traits seem close to the mark.

His parents are Christians — his father quit his job in IT to become a pastor, while his mother works at a community centre that provides counselling — and named their son after the prophet who led the Israelites to the promised land.

Like many young people in Hong Kong, whose housing market has been ranked as the world’s most unaffordable, he still lives at home, in South Horizons, a commuter community on the south side of the main island.

Wong was a dyslexic but talkative child, telling jokes in church groups and bombarding his elders with questions about their faith. “By speaking confidently, I was able to make up for my weaknesses,” he writes. “The microphone loved me and I loved it even more.”

In 2011, he and a group of friends, some of whom are his fellow activists today, launched Scholarism, a student activist group, to oppose the introduction of “moral and national education” to their school curriculum — code for communist brainwashing, critics believed. “I lived the life of Peter Parker,” he says. “Like Spider-Man’s alter-ego, I went to class during the day and rushed out to fight evil after school.”

The next year, the authorities issued a teaching manual that hailed the Chinese Communist Party as an “advanced and selfless regime”. For Wong, “it confirmed all our suspicions and fears about communist propaganda”.

In August 2012, members of Scholarism launched an occupation protest outside the Hong Kong government’s headquarters. Wong told a crowd of 120,000 students and parents: “Tonight we have one message and one message only: withdraw the brainwashing curriculum. We’ve had enough of this government. Hong Kongers will prevail.”

Remarkably, the kids won. Leung Chun-ying, the territory’s chief executive at the time, backed down. Buoyed by their success, the youngsters of Scholarism joined forces with other civil rights groups to protest about the lack of progress towards electing the next chief executive by universal suffrage — laid out as a goal in the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s constitution. Their protests culminated in the “umbrella movement” occupation of central Hong Kong for 79 days in 2014.

Two years later, Wong and other leaders set up a political group, Demosisto. He has always been at pains to emphasise he is not calling for independence — a complete red line for Beijing. Demosisto has even dropped the words “self-determination” from its stated goals — perhaps to ease prospects for its candidates in elections to Legco, the territory’s legislative council, in September.

Wong won’t say whether he will stand himself, but he is emphatically political, making a plea for change from within — not simply for anger on the streets — and for stepping up international pressure: “I am one of the facilitators to let the voices of Hong Kong people be heard in the international community, especially since 2016.”

There are tensions between moderates and radicals. Some of the hardliners on the streets last year considered Wong already to be part of the Establishment, a backer of the failed protests of the past.

So why bother? What’s the point of a city of seven million taking on one of the world’s nastiest authoritarian states, with a population of about 1.4 billion? And in any case, won’t it all be over in 2047, the end of the “one country, two systems” deal agreed between China and Britain, which was supposed to guarantee a high degree of autonomy for another 50 years? Does he fear tanks and a repetition of the Tiananmen Square killings?

Wong acknowledges there are gloomy scenarios but remains a robust optimist. “Freedom and democracy can prevail in the same way that they did in eastern Europe, even though before the Berlin Wall fell, few people believed it would happen.”

He is tired of the predictions of think-tank pundits, journalists and the like. Three decades ago, with the implosion of communism in the Soviet bloc, many were confidently saying that the demise of the people’s republic was only a matter of time. Jump forward 20 years, amid the enthusiasm after the Beijing Olympics, and they were predicting market reforms and a growing middle class would presage liberalisation.

Neither scenario has unfolded, Wong notes. “They are pretending to hold the crystal ball to predict the future, but look at their record and it is clear no one knows what will happen by 2047. Will the Communist Party even still exist?”

https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1119445/unfree-speech

【 黎安友專文 l 中國如何看待香港危機 】

美國哥倫比亞大學的資深中國通黎安友（Andrew Nathan）教授最近在《外交事務》（Foreign Affairs）雜誌的專文，值得一看。

黎安友是台灣許多中國研究學者的前輩級老師，小英總統去哥大演講時，正是他積極促成。小英在美國的僑宴，黎安友也是座上賓。

這篇文章的標題是：「中國如何看待香港危機：北京自我克制背後的真正原因」。

文章很長，而且用英文寫，需要花點時間閱讀。大家有空可以看看。

Andrew這篇文章的立論基礎，是來自北京核心圈的匿名說法。以他在學術界的地位，我相信他對消息來源已經做了足夠的事實查核或確認。

這篇文章，是在回答一個疑問：中共為何在香港事件如此自制？有人說是怕西方譴責，有人說是怕損害香港的金融地位。

都不是。這篇文章認為，上述兩者都不是中共的真實顧慮。

無論你多痛恨中共，你都必須真實面對你的敵人。

中共是搞經濟階級鬥爭起家的，當年用階級鬥爭打敗國民黨。而現在，中共正用這樣的思維處理香港議題。

文章有一句話：“China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence.” 這句話道盡階級鬥爭的精髓。

中共一點都不焦慮。相反地，中共很有自信，香港的菁英階級及既得利益的收編群體，到最後會支持中共。

這個分化的心理基礎，來自經濟上的利益。

文中還提到，鄧小平當年給香港五十年的一國兩制，就是為了「給香港足夠的時間適應中共的政治系統」。

1997年，香港的GDP佔中國的18%。2018年，這個比例降到2.8%。

今日的香港經濟，在中共的評估，是香港需要中國，而不是中國需要香港。

中共正在在意的，是香港的高房價問題。香港的房價，在過去十年內三倍翻漲。

文章是這樣描述：
“Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.”

無論你同不同意這些說法，都請你試圖客觀地看看這篇文章。

有趣的是，黎安友在文章中部分論點引述了他的消息來源（但他並沒有加上個人評論），部分是他自己的觀察。

#護台胖犬劉仕傑
Instagram: old_dog_chasing_ball

新書：《 我在外交部工作 》

**

黎安友原文：

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-30/how-china-sees-hong-kong-crisis?fbclid=IwAR2PwHns5gWrw0fT0sa5LuO8zgv4PhLmkYfegtBgoOMCD3WJFI3w5NTe0S4

How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis
The Real Reasons Behind Beijing’s Restraint

By Andrew J. Nathan September 30, 2019

Massive and sometimes violent protests have rocked Hong Kong for over 100 days. Demonstrators have put forward five demands, of which the most radical is a call for free, direct elections of Hong Kong’s chief executive and all members of the territory’s legislature: in other words, a fully democratic system of local rule, one not controlled by Beijing. As this brazen challenge to Chinese sovereignty has played out, Beijing has made a show of amassing paramilitary forces just across the border in Shenzhen. So far, however, China has not deployed force to quell the unrest and top Chinese leaders have refrained from making public threats to do so.

Western observers who remember the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago have been puzzled by Beijing’s forbearance. Some have attributed Beijing’s restraint to a fear of Western condemnation if China uses force. Others have pointed to Beijing’s concern that a crackdown would damage Hong Kong’s role as a financial center for China.

But according to two Chinese scholars who have connections to regime insiders and who requested anonymity to discuss the thinking of policymakers in Beijing, China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence. Beijing is convinced that Hong Kong’s elites and a substantial part of the public do not support the demonstrators and that what truly ails the territory are economic problems rather than political ones—in particular, a combination of stagnant incomes and rising rents. Beijing also believes that, despite the appearance of disorder, its grip on Hong Kong society remains firm. The Chinese Communist Party has long cultivated the territory’s business elites (the so-called tycoons) by offering them favorable economic access to the mainland. The party also maintains a long-standing loyal cadre of underground members in the territory. And China has forged ties with the Hong Kong labor movement and some sections of its criminal underground. Finally, Beijing believes that many ordinary citizens are fearful of change and tired of the disruption caused by the demonstrations.

Beijing therefore thinks that its local allies will stand firm and that the demonstrations will gradually lose public support and eventually die out. As the demonstrations shrink, some frustrated activists will engage in further violence, and that in turn will accelerate the movement’s decline. Meanwhile, Beijing is turning its attention to economic development projects that it believes will address some of the underlying grievances that led many people to take to the streets in the first place.

This view of the situation is held by those at the very top of the regime in Beijing, as evidenced by recent remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping, some of which have not been previously reported. In a speech Xi delivered in early September to a new class of rising political stars at the Central Party School in Beijing, he rejected the suggestion of some officials that China should declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong and send in the People’s Liberation Army. “That would be going down a political road of no return,” Xi said. “The central government will exercise the most patience and restraint and allow the [regional government] and the local police force to resolve the crisis.” In separate remarks that Xi made around the same time, he spelled out what he sees as the proper way to proceed: “Economic development is the only golden key to resolving all sorts of problems facing Hong Kong today.”

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, MANY QUESTIONS

Chinese decision-makers are hardly surprised that Hong Kong is chafing under their rule. Beijing believes it has treated Hong Kong with a light hand and has supported the territory’s economy in many ways, especially by granting it special access to the mainland’s stocks and currency markets, exempting it from the taxes and fees that other Chinese provinces and municipalities pay the central government, and guaranteeing a reliable supply of water, electricity, gas, and food. Even so, Beijing considers disaffection among Hong Kong’s residents a natural outgrowth of the territory’s colonial British past and also a result of the continuing influence of Western values. Indeed, during the 1984 negotiations between China and the United Kingdom over Hong Kong’s future, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping suggested following the approach of “one country, two systems” for 50 years precisely to give people in Hong Kong plenty of time to get used to the Chinese political system.

But “one country, two systems” was never intended to result in Hong Kong spinning out of China’s control. Under the Basic Law that China crafted as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” Beijing retained the right to prevent any challenge to what it considered its core security interests. The law empowered Beijing to determine if and when Hong Kongers could directly elect the territory’s leadership, allowed Beijing to veto laws passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and granted China the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law. And there would be no question about who had a monopoly of force. During the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Deng publicly rebuked a top Chinese defense official—General Geng Biao, who at the time was a patron of a rising young official named Xi Jinping—for suggesting that there might not be any need to put troops in Hong Kong. Deng insisted that a Chinese garrison was necessary to symbolize Chinese sovereignty.

Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong.

At first, Hong Kongers seemed to accept their new role as citizens of a rising China. In 1997, in a tracking poll of Hong Kong residents regularly conducted by researchers at the University of Hong Kong, 47 percent of respondents identified themselves as “proud” citizens of China. But things went downhill from there. In 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to introduce “patriotic education” in elementary and middle schools, but the proposed curriculum ran into a storm of local opposition and had to be withdrawn. In 2014, the 79-day Umbrella Movement brought hundreds of thousands of citizens into the streets to protest Beijing’s refusal to allow direct elections for the chief executive. And as authoritarianism has intensified under Xi’s rule, events such as the 2015 kidnapping of five Hong Kong–based publishers to stand trial in the mainland further soured Hong Kong opinion. By this past June, only 27 percent of respondents to the tracking poll described themselves as “proud” to be citizens of China. This year’s demonstrations started as a protest against a proposed law that would have allowed Hong Kongers suspected of criminal wrongdoing to be extradited to the mainland but then developed into a broad-based expression of discontent over the lack of democratic accountability, police brutality, and, most fundamentally, what was perceived as a mainland assault on Hong Kong’s unique identity.

Still, Chinese leaders do not blame themselves for these shifts in public opinion. Rather, they believe that Western powers, especially the United States, have sought to drive a wedge between Hong Kong and the mainland. Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong. As Xi explained in his speech in September:
As extreme elements in Hong Kong turn more and more violent, Western forces, especially the United States, have been increasingly open in their involvement. Some extreme anti-China forces in the United States are trying to turn Hong Kong into the battleground for U.S.-Chinese rivalry…. They want to turn Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy into de facto independence, with the ultimate objective to contain China's rise and prevent the revival of the great Chinese nation.

Chinese leaders do not fear that a crackdown on Hong Kong would inspire Western antagonism. Rather, they take such antagonism as a preexisting reality—one that goes a long way toward explaining why the disorder in Hong Kong broke out in the first place. In Beijing’s eyes, Western hostility is rooted in the mere fact of China’s rise, and thus there is no use in tailoring China’s Hong Kong strategy to influence how Western powers would respond.

IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BENJAMINS

The view that Xi has not deployed troops because of Hong Kong’s economic importance to the mainland is also misguided, and relies on an outdated view of the balance of economic power. In 1997, Hong Kong’s GDP was equivalent to 18 percent of the mainland’s. Most of China’s foreign trade was conducted through Hong Kong, providing China with badly needed hard currencies. Chinese companies raised most of their capital on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Today, things are vastly different. In 2018, Hong Kong’s GDP was equal to only 2.7 percent of the mainland’s. Shenzhen alone has overtaken Hong Kong in terms of GDP. Less than 12 percent of China’s exports now flow through Hong Kong. The combined market value of China’s domestic stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen far surpasses that of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Chinese companies can also list in Frankfurt, London, New York, and elsewhere.

Although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Investment flowing into and out of China still tends to pass through financial holding vehicles set up in Hong Kong, in order to benefit from the region’s legal protections. But China’s new foreign investment law (which will take effect on January 1, 2020) and other recent policy changes mean that such investment will soon be able to bypass Hong Kong. And although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.

Wrecking Hong Kong’s economy by using military force to impose emergency rule would not be a good thing for China. But the negative effect on the mainland’s prosperity would not be strong enough to prevent Beijing from doing whatever it believes is necessary to maintain control over the territory.

CAN’T BUY ME LOVE?

As it waits out the current crisis, Beijing has already started tackling the economic problems that it believes are the source of much of the anger among Hong Kongers. Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.