關於 what is median ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

Do Higher Wages Mean Higher Standards of Living?

A recent macroblog post used Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker data to observe that the hourly wage of the lowest-paid workers has rebounded ( ) in recent years after declining for a decade.

The chart below depicts ( ) this finding, showing the median ( ) hourly wage ( ) of the lowest-paid ( ) 25 percent of workers in the Tracker sample relative ( ) to the median for all workers.

Moreover, the post showed that this recovery was not just a story about states and localities ( ) increasing their minimum wages. It also appears that there has been a significant tightening in the labor market for unskilled or low-skilled jobs.

Taken at face value, this is good news for workers employed in low-wage jobs.

But here's the rub ( ): the median wage in the first quartile ( ) is still low—$11.50 in 2019, or 55 percent of the overall median wage.

Moreover, these are hourly wages before taxes and transfers ( ).

They don't represent what is happening to these workers' ability to make ends meet ( ), which depends crucially on income after taxes and transfers.

For households at the bottom of the income distribution, means-tested ( ) transfers can play an especially important role.

The size of the transfers tends to decrease as earnings ( ) increase, and they stop altogether when a worker exceeds income- and asset-eligibility thresholds ( ).

The interaction between changes in earnings and various means-tested public assistance programs is an important public policy issue, and it is one that staff at the Atlanta Fed are studying.

薪資成長代表生活水準提高？

理財網站macroblog最近發布一則公告，使用亞特蘭大聯邦儲備銀行的薪資成長追蹤數據，觀察到每小時最低工資持續幾十年來的下滑，終於在近幾年開始反彈。

以下圖表所顯示的結果，呈現前25%低的時薪中位數樣本，和所有時薪樣本中位數之間的關係。

此外，該公告顯示這波復甦不只是探討最低薪資在各州與地方的成長，更指出低技術或無技術勞動市場明顯地緊縮。

表面的價值觀看來，這對從事低薪行業的勞工來說是個好消息。
但難處在於：前四分之一低的時薪中位數仍處在低處—如2019年為11.5元，同時也是前55%低的時薪中位數。

不只如此，這些薪資還是不包含稅和生活津貼(又稱「轉移收入」)。
他們沒有說的是，這些勞工的工作能力如何導致他們生活在薪資結構的底層，只能拮据地仰賴稅後收入和生活津貼。

對分配在薪資結構底層的家庭來說，透過資格審查才能獲得的生活津貼對他們是非常重要的。

生活津貼的多寡隨著收入提高而降低，當收入和資產達到一定的標準時，他們就不再有生活津貼。

收入的變化和眾多具資格審查的公共補助計畫，相互影響之下成為公共政策中的一大問題，也是亞特蘭大聯邦儲備銀行職員正在進行的研究。

#高雄人 #學習英文 請找 #多益達人林立英文
#高中英文 #成人英文
#多益家教班 #商用英文
#國立大學外國語文學系講師
#新聞英文

I'm a private tutor. I run a small tuition centre. After deducting rent, marketing & administrative costs - I take home around $2500 a month. I teach more than 10 classes weekly.
It has been a very demoralising few weeks.

1. Amidst the suspension of centre-based tuition classes - parents have asked for discount on fees. I tried to help whenever I can by waiving off fees or giving discounts, knowing fully that it will be at my own expense.

Yet, I've received a lot of comments from parents who do not have financial difficulties, going "e-learning should be cheaper".

e-Learning IS not cheaper than classroom based learning. It has been 2 sleepless weeks with this mad scramble to move classes online. We've had to to spend sessions doing orientation for you and your children to help explain how to do classes online. We had to buy IT equipment, video recording equipment - all of it not cheap with my measly $2500 monthly salary.

You think it's less effort - it's not. It's more effort and more work. And you want to pay us less.

Please don't undermine our efforts by requesting to pay us less. If you have financial difficulties, we will discount for you. But don't say "e-Learning should be paid less". Thanks.

Rental still goes on - landlords who don't take the initiative to help and pass on rental rebates, I'm looking at YOU!

2. We totally understand that why we have been closed down. Health comes first - sure.
However, can don't call us non-essential?
School is essential, tuition is non-essential. Minister said that. True facts of life.
But, but. Can you also see this.
In every sector, there are good people and there are bad people.
In the tuition sector, there are some of us good ones and some of us bad ones.
I dare say, I care about each and every-one of my students. I do my best to motivate. I do my best to talk to them when they have family troubles. I come up with extra worksheets when I know they are lagging behind.
In schools, you also have teachers who are not motivated, who only come to school for the paycheck and do the minimum.
If all school teachers are good - need tuition teachers for what?
If everybody scoring A1, A2 and A* - then no need for tuition. Some parents find tuition because their kids have been failing.
We don't need you to recognise us. But don't call us non-essential can?

3. Common comment from school teachers and from the public - "They should pay school teachers more" or "Tuition teachers make so much money".
You know how many times I roll my eyes at this?
Straits Times - I'm looking at you. Thanks for always reporting on "million dollar" tutors. Now everybody thinks that all tutors make millions.
Reality check - If you are a school teacher and you think you will make a lot of money leaving the public sector, feel free to go try your luck.
Is every school teacher a Principal? or a Cluster Superintendent? or a Director? No right?
Same thing with the private sector ok? The top tutors make a lot of money. The normal tutors like us make close to the 'median' $4600 of the typical Singaporean.
We don't have CPF.
We don't have AWS.
We don't have performance bonus.
In November & December, we eat bread but still pay rent.
Whatever we earn in 10 months, must ration across 12 months, because November & December parents go holiday and don't want tuition.
No - regular tutors don't make millions.
Stop dreaming. Most school teachers are not zai. If they leave the public sector, they will eat grass.
I make $2500 a month - if you feel that is fantastic, you can be my guest. You have a choice. If you think you can make more as a private tutor, take the plunge into the world of the unknown.

4. Teachers got a lot of admin work, not like private tutor only need to teach
We don't have admin work. We have "admin work" - marketing, accounting & trying to keep the business alive. We don't only teach.
You have a 'clear thick' line between yourself and parents. We don't. We are obligated to answer, and talk to parents everyday. Do you know there are parents who call us and talk to us everyday about their kids and their anxieties? (a lot of parents from top schools are actually very anxious about their kids) I spend 1 to 2 hours daily talking to 2 to 3 parents everyday.

5. Thank you for classifying us together with KTVs, Bars & Entertainment
I called the bank to lower my credit card interest because in anticipation of school closures, I invested heavily in video recording equipment and IT equipment that I actually cannot pay for with my measly salary.
Guess what the bank said? You are not from an eligible 'adversely affected' sector.
Adversely affected = tourism, aviation, F&B and entertainment.
Entertainment qualifies but private education doesn't qualify.
Again, i understand why we have been shut down. But can everyone remember us private tutors have families to feed too? Mortgages or rent to pay? Bills to pay?

6. We are human beings too
We have feelings. We have empathy. We have tried to help whenever we can. My tuition centre offers free tuition all these years to whomever are on MOE Financial Assistance scheme. When parents face difficulties (retrenched, fell sick), we always cut our fees or give free. When students ask for extra help, we coach and we don't charge extra.

We are trying our best too. Really. We are all in this together.
I don't know since when being a 'private tutor' is a nasty thing.
Maybe tuition centres like Learning Lab, Mavis Tutorial or any of those big tuition centres with big MRT and bus adverts and sprawling land space of more than 10000 square feet might make millions of dollars a year. Maybe they have strong investors with hundreds of millions. But hey that's not us. Don't assume that we have a mountain of profits to stomach this because we don't.

Also, a lot of our kids and a lot of our parents always tell us that school teachers always say bad things about private tutors. "Tuition is a waste of money", "don't need go for tuition", "private tutors are not qualified and don't know what they are teaching".
Some teachers seem to spend a lot of time bad-mouthing private tutors.
Just focus on teaching your kids please. You still have a job.
I may not have one when the dust settles.
Also, remember that a lot of us private tutors were once school teachers.
Some of us left because of school mergers.
Some of us left because we were pregnant, had kids and could no longer cope.
Some of us left because we don't want to deal with this crap called EPMS.
Some of us left because we don't want to deal with all the politics, committees, organising overseas trips and want to just focus on the kids.

Please support your tutors, thank you. A lot of us, really do care, genuinely for your child.
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#80161: https://www.nuswhispers.com/confession/80161

【 黎安友專文 l 中國如何看待香港危機 】

美國哥倫比亞大學的資深中國通黎安友（Andrew Nathan）教授最近在《外交事務》（Foreign Affairs）雜誌的專文，值得一看。

黎安友是台灣許多中國研究學者的前輩級老師，小英總統去哥大演講時，正是他積極促成。小英在美國的僑宴，黎安友也是座上賓。

這篇文章的標題是：「中國如何看待香港危機：北京自我克制背後的真正原因」。

文章很長，而且用英文寫，需要花點時間閱讀。大家有空可以看看。

Andrew這篇文章的立論基礎，是來自北京核心圈的匿名說法。以他在學術界的地位，我相信他對消息來源已經做了足夠的事實查核或確認。

這篇文章，是在回答一個疑問：中共為何在香港事件如此自制？有人說是怕西方譴責，有人說是怕損害香港的金融地位。

都不是。這篇文章認為，上述兩者都不是中共的真實顧慮。

無論你多痛恨中共，你都必須真實面對你的敵人。

中共是搞經濟階級鬥爭起家的，當年用階級鬥爭打敗國民黨。而現在，中共正用這樣的思維處理香港議題。

文章有一句話：“China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence.” 這句話道盡階級鬥爭的精髓。

中共一點都不焦慮。相反地，中共很有自信，香港的菁英階級及既得利益的收編群體，到最後會支持中共。

這個分化的心理基礎，來自經濟上的利益。

文中還提到，鄧小平當年給香港五十年的一國兩制，就是為了「給香港足夠的時間適應中共的政治系統」。

1997年，香港的GDP佔中國的18%。2018年，這個比例降到2.8%。

今日的香港經濟，在中共的評估，是香港需要中國，而不是中國需要香港。

中共正在在意的，是香港的高房價問題。香港的房價，在過去十年內三倍翻漲。

文章是這樣描述：
“Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.”

無論你同不同意這些說法，都請你試圖客觀地看看這篇文章。

有趣的是，黎安友在文章中部分論點引述了他的消息來源（但他並沒有加上個人評論），部分是他自己的觀察。

#護台胖犬劉仕傑
Instagram: old_dog_chasing_ball

新書：《 我在外交部工作 》

**

黎安友原文：

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-30/how-china-sees-hong-kong-crisis?fbclid=IwAR2PwHns5gWrw0fT0sa5LuO8zgv4PhLmkYfegtBgoOMCD3WJFI3w5NTe0S4

How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis
The Real Reasons Behind Beijing’s Restraint

By Andrew J. Nathan September 30, 2019

Massive and sometimes violent protests have rocked Hong Kong for over 100 days. Demonstrators have put forward five demands, of which the most radical is a call for free, direct elections of Hong Kong’s chief executive and all members of the territory’s legislature: in other words, a fully democratic system of local rule, one not controlled by Beijing. As this brazen challenge to Chinese sovereignty has played out, Beijing has made a show of amassing paramilitary forces just across the border in Shenzhen. So far, however, China has not deployed force to quell the unrest and top Chinese leaders have refrained from making public threats to do so.

Western observers who remember the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago have been puzzled by Beijing’s forbearance. Some have attributed Beijing’s restraint to a fear of Western condemnation if China uses force. Others have pointed to Beijing’s concern that a crackdown would damage Hong Kong’s role as a financial center for China.

But according to two Chinese scholars who have connections to regime insiders and who requested anonymity to discuss the thinking of policymakers in Beijing, China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence. Beijing is convinced that Hong Kong’s elites and a substantial part of the public do not support the demonstrators and that what truly ails the territory are economic problems rather than political ones—in particular, a combination of stagnant incomes and rising rents. Beijing also believes that, despite the appearance of disorder, its grip on Hong Kong society remains firm. The Chinese Communist Party has long cultivated the territory’s business elites (the so-called tycoons) by offering them favorable economic access to the mainland. The party also maintains a long-standing loyal cadre of underground members in the territory. And China has forged ties with the Hong Kong labor movement and some sections of its criminal underground. Finally, Beijing believes that many ordinary citizens are fearful of change and tired of the disruption caused by the demonstrations.

Beijing therefore thinks that its local allies will stand firm and that the demonstrations will gradually lose public support and eventually die out. As the demonstrations shrink, some frustrated activists will engage in further violence, and that in turn will accelerate the movement’s decline. Meanwhile, Beijing is turning its attention to economic development projects that it believes will address some of the underlying grievances that led many people to take to the streets in the first place.

This view of the situation is held by those at the very top of the regime in Beijing, as evidenced by recent remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping, some of which have not been previously reported. In a speech Xi delivered in early September to a new class of rising political stars at the Central Party School in Beijing, he rejected the suggestion of some officials that China should declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong and send in the People’s Liberation Army. “That would be going down a political road of no return,” Xi said. “The central government will exercise the most patience and restraint and allow the [regional government] and the local police force to resolve the crisis.” In separate remarks that Xi made around the same time, he spelled out what he sees as the proper way to proceed: “Economic development is the only golden key to resolving all sorts of problems facing Hong Kong today.”

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, MANY QUESTIONS

Chinese decision-makers are hardly surprised that Hong Kong is chafing under their rule. Beijing believes it has treated Hong Kong with a light hand and has supported the territory’s economy in many ways, especially by granting it special access to the mainland’s stocks and currency markets, exempting it from the taxes and fees that other Chinese provinces and municipalities pay the central government, and guaranteeing a reliable supply of water, electricity, gas, and food. Even so, Beijing considers disaffection among Hong Kong’s residents a natural outgrowth of the territory’s colonial British past and also a result of the continuing influence of Western values. Indeed, during the 1984 negotiations between China and the United Kingdom over Hong Kong’s future, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping suggested following the approach of “one country, two systems” for 50 years precisely to give people in Hong Kong plenty of time to get used to the Chinese political system.

But “one country, two systems” was never intended to result in Hong Kong spinning out of China’s control. Under the Basic Law that China crafted as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” Beijing retained the right to prevent any challenge to what it considered its core security interests. The law empowered Beijing to determine if and when Hong Kongers could directly elect the territory’s leadership, allowed Beijing to veto laws passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and granted China the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law. And there would be no question about who had a monopoly of force. During the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Deng publicly rebuked a top Chinese defense official—General Geng Biao, who at the time was a patron of a rising young official named Xi Jinping—for suggesting that there might not be any need to put troops in Hong Kong. Deng insisted that a Chinese garrison was necessary to symbolize Chinese sovereignty.

Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong.

At first, Hong Kongers seemed to accept their new role as citizens of a rising China. In 1997, in a tracking poll of Hong Kong residents regularly conducted by researchers at the University of Hong Kong, 47 percent of respondents identified themselves as “proud” citizens of China. But things went downhill from there. In 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to introduce “patriotic education” in elementary and middle schools, but the proposed curriculum ran into a storm of local opposition and had to be withdrawn. In 2014, the 79-day Umbrella Movement brought hundreds of thousands of citizens into the streets to protest Beijing’s refusal to allow direct elections for the chief executive. And as authoritarianism has intensified under Xi’s rule, events such as the 2015 kidnapping of five Hong Kong–based publishers to stand trial in the mainland further soured Hong Kong opinion. By this past June, only 27 percent of respondents to the tracking poll described themselves as “proud” to be citizens of China. This year’s demonstrations started as a protest against a proposed law that would have allowed Hong Kongers suspected of criminal wrongdoing to be extradited to the mainland but then developed into a broad-based expression of discontent over the lack of democratic accountability, police brutality, and, most fundamentally, what was perceived as a mainland assault on Hong Kong’s unique identity.

Still, Chinese leaders do not blame themselves for these shifts in public opinion. Rather, they believe that Western powers, especially the United States, have sought to drive a wedge between Hong Kong and the mainland. Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong. As Xi explained in his speech in September:
As extreme elements in Hong Kong turn more and more violent, Western forces, especially the United States, have been increasingly open in their involvement. Some extreme anti-China forces in the United States are trying to turn Hong Kong into the battleground for U.S.-Chinese rivalry…. They want to turn Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy into de facto independence, with the ultimate objective to contain China's rise and prevent the revival of the great Chinese nation.

Chinese leaders do not fear that a crackdown on Hong Kong would inspire Western antagonism. Rather, they take such antagonism as a preexisting reality—one that goes a long way toward explaining why the disorder in Hong Kong broke out in the first place. In Beijing’s eyes, Western hostility is rooted in the mere fact of China’s rise, and thus there is no use in tailoring China’s Hong Kong strategy to influence how Western powers would respond.

IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BENJAMINS

The view that Xi has not deployed troops because of Hong Kong’s economic importance to the mainland is also misguided, and relies on an outdated view of the balance of economic power. In 1997, Hong Kong’s GDP was equivalent to 18 percent of the mainland’s. Most of China’s foreign trade was conducted through Hong Kong, providing China with badly needed hard currencies. Chinese companies raised most of their capital on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Today, things are vastly different. In 2018, Hong Kong’s GDP was equal to only 2.7 percent of the mainland’s. Shenzhen alone has overtaken Hong Kong in terms of GDP. Less than 12 percent of China’s exports now flow through Hong Kong. The combined market value of China’s domestic stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen far surpasses that of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Chinese companies can also list in Frankfurt, London, New York, and elsewhere.

Although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Investment flowing into and out of China still tends to pass through financial holding vehicles set up in Hong Kong, in order to benefit from the region’s legal protections. But China’s new foreign investment law (which will take effect on January 1, 2020) and other recent policy changes mean that such investment will soon be able to bypass Hong Kong. And although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.

Wrecking Hong Kong’s economy by using military force to impose emergency rule would not be a good thing for China. But the negative effect on the mainland’s prosperity would not be strong enough to prevent Beijing from doing whatever it believes is necessary to maintain control over the territory.

CAN’T BUY ME LOVE?

As it waits out the current crisis, Beijing has already started tackling the economic problems that it believes are the source of much of the anger among Hong Kongers. Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.

Here is another original song I wrote in the last 3 weeks. This one is about central tendencies. More songs to come!

Hope you like it!

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