關於 make an appeal ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

Bill Cosby被放出來了！

2018年Bill Cosby被判有罪的時候，在美國＃metoo運動被視為指標性判決之一。當時判有罪，已經在法界有很多爭議，他的律師當時就很氣憤，說Bill Cosby的案子緊跟著Harvey Weinstein的案子後面，根本不可能有公平的審判。但當時的民氣，認為是正義受到伸張。

這次上訴法庭的七位法官就以6－1的懸殊比數，駁回了下級法院的有罪判決。認為Bill Cosby當時是跟檢察官達成協議，不會受到刑事法庭起訴的條件，才去民事法庭作證。所以他根本就不應該被刑事起訴

Mr. Cosby’s lawyers, who had said at the time that allegations against Mr. Weinstein would make it difficult for them to receive a fair trial, later suggested in an appeal that the outcome had been influenced by what they described as a period of “public panic.”

In their 79-page opinion, the judges wrote that a previous prosecutor’s statement that Mr. Cosby would not face charges, which paved the way for Mr. Cosby to testify in a civil trial, meant that he should not have been charged in the case. It was a 6-to-1 ruling, with two of the judges in the majority dissenting on the remedy, which barred a retrial.

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/30/arts/television/bill-cosby-release-conviction.html?smid=url-share

這是前些日子爆出已經被加拿大法院接理對藏傳佛教噶舉派法王的訟訴。（加拿大法院鏈接在此：https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/sc/21/09/2021BCSC0939cor1.htm?fbclid=IwAR2FLZlzmUIGTBaTuKPVchEqqngcE3Qy6G_C0TWNWVKa2ksbIYkVJVMQ8f8）

這位法王的桃色事件，我是幾年前才聽到。但，藏傳佛教的高層有這些性醜聞，我已經聽了幾十年。我以前的一位前女友也被一些堪布藉故上她的家摟抱過，也有一些活佛跟她表白。（這不只是她，其他地方我也聽過不少）

這是一個藏傳佛教裡面系統式的問題。

很多時候發生這種事情，信徒和教主往往都是說女方得不到寵而報仇，或者說她們也精神病，或者說她們撒謊。

我不排除有這種可能性，但，多過一位，甚至多位出來指證的時候，我是傾向於相信『沒有那麼巧這麼多有精神病的女人要撒謊來報仇』。

大寶法王的桃色事件，最先吹哨的是一位台灣的在家信徒，第二位是香港的女出家人，現在加拿大又多一位公開舉報上法庭。

對大寶法王信徒來說，這一次的比較麻煩，因為是有孩子的。（關於有孩子的，我早在法王的桃色事件曝光時，就有聽聞）

如果法庭勒令要驗證DNA，這對法王和他的信徒來說，會很尷尬和矛盾，因為做或不做，都死。

你若問我，我覺得『人數是有力量的』，同時我也覺得之後有更多的人站出來，是不出奇的。

我也藉此呼籲各方佛教徒，如果你們真的愛佛教，先別說批判，但如鴕鳥般不討論這些爭議，你是間接害了佛教。

（下面是我從加拿大法院鏈接拷貝下來的內容，當中有很多細節。）

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

ANALYSIS

A. The Spousal Support Claim in this Case

B. The Test to Amend Pleadings

C. Pleadings in Family Law Cases

D. The Legal Concept of a Marriage-Like Relationship

E. Is There a Reasonable Claim of a Marriage-Like Relationship?

F. Delay / Prejudice

CONCLUSION



INTRODUCTION
[1] The claimant applies to amend her notice of family claim to seek spousal support. At issue is whether the claimant’s allegations give rise to a reasonable claim she lived with the respondent in a marriage-like relationship, so as to give rise to a potential entitlement to spousal support under the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 (“FLA”).

[2] The facts alleged by the claimant do not fit within a traditional concept of marriage. The claimant does not allege that she and the respondent ever lived together. Indeed, she has only met the respondent in person four times: twice very briefly in a public setting; a third time in private, when she alleges the respondent sexually assaulted her; and a fourth and final occasion, when she informed the respondent she was pregnant with his child.

[3] The claimant’s case is that what began as a non-consensual sexual encounter evolved into a loving and affectionate relationship. That relationship occurred almost entirely over private text messages. The parties rarely spoke on the telephone, and never saw one another during the relationship, even over video. The claimant says they could not be together because the respondent is forbidden by his station and religious beliefs from intimate relationships or marriage. Nonetheless, she alleges, they formed a marriage-like relationship that lasted from January 2018 to January 2019.

[4] The respondent denies any romantic relationship with the claimant. While he acknowledges providing emotional and financial support to the claimant, he says it was for the benefit of the child the claimant told him was his daughter.

[5] The claimant’s proposed amendment raises a novel question: can a secret relationship that began on-line and never moved into the physical world be like a marriage? In my view, that question should be answered by a trial judge after hearing all of the evidence. The alleged facts give rise to a reasonable claim the claimant lived with the respondent in a marriage-like relationship. Accordingly, I grant the claimant leave to amend her notice of family claim.

BACKGROUND
[6] It should be emphasized that this is an application to amend pleadings only. The allegations by the claimant are presumed to be true for the purposes of this application. Those allegations have not been tested in a court of law.

[7] The respondent, Ogyen Trinley Dorje, is a high lama of the Karma Kagyu School of Tibetan Buddhism. He has been recognized and enthroned as His Holiness, the 17th Gyalwang Karmapa. Without meaning any disrespect, I will refer to him as Mr. Dorje in these reasons for judgment.

[8] Mr. Dorje leads a monastic and nomadic lifestyle. His true home is Tibet, but he currently resides in India. He receives followers from around the world at the Gyuto Monetary in India. He also travels the world teaching Tibetan Buddhist Dharma and hosting pujas, ceremonies at which Buddhists express their gratitude and devotion to the Buddha.

[9] The claimant, Vikki Hui Xin Han, is a former nun of Tibetan Buddhism. Ms. Han first encountered Mr. Dorje briefly at a large puja in 2014. The experience of the puja convinced Ms. Han she wanted to become a Buddhist nun. She met briefly with Mr. Dorje, in accordance with Kagyu traditions, to obtain his approval to become a nun.

[10] In October 2016, Ms. Han began a three-year, three-month meditation retreat at a monastery in New York State. Her objective was to learn the practices and teachings of the Kagyu Lineage. Mr. Dorje was present at the retreat twice during the time Ms. Han was at the monastery.

[11] Ms. Han alleges that on October 14, 2017, Mr. Dorje sexually assaulted her in her room at the monastery. She alleges that she became pregnant from the assault.

[12] After she learned that she was pregnant, Ms. Han requested a private audience with Mr. Dorje. In November 2017, in the presence of his bodyguards, Ms. Han informed Mr. Dorje she was pregnant with his child. Mr. Dorje initially denied responsibility; however, he provided Ms. Han with his email address and a cellphone number, and, according to Ms. Han, said he would “prepare some money” for her.

[13] Ms. Han abandoned her plan to become a nun, left the retreat and returned to Canada. She never saw Mr. Dorje again.

[14] After Ms. Han returned to Canada, she and Mr. Dorje began a regular communication over an instant messaging app called Line. They also exchanged emails and occasionally spoke on the telephone.

[15] The parties appear to have expressed care and affection for one another in these communications. I say “appear to” because it is difficult to fully understand the meaning and intentions of another person from brief text messages, especially those originally written in a different language. The parties wrote in a private shorthand, sharing jokes, emojis, cartoon portraits and “hugs” or “kisses”. Ms. Han was the more expressive of the two, writing more frequently and in longer messages. Mr. Dorje generally participated in response to questions or prompting from Ms. Han, sometimes in single word messages.

[16] Ms. Han deposes that she believed Mr. Dorje was in love with her and that, by January 2018, she and Mr. Dorje were living in a “conjugal relationship”.

[17] During their communications, Ms. Han expressed concern that her child would be “illegitimate”. She appears to have asked Mr. Dorje to marry her, and he appears to have responded that he was “not ready”.

[18] Throughout 2018, Mr. Dorje transferred funds in various denominations to Ms. Han through various third parties. Ms. Han deposes that these funds were:

a) $50,000 CDN to deliver the child and for postpartum care she was to receive at a facility in Seattle;

b) $300,000 CDN for the first year of the child’s life;

c) $20,000 USD for a wedding ring, because Ms. Han wrote “Even if we cannot get married, you must buy me a wedding ring”;

d) $400,000 USD to purchase a home for the mother and child.

[19] On June 19, 2018, Ms. Han gave birth to a daughter in Richmond, B.C.

[20] On September 17, 2018, Mr. Dorje wrote, ”Taking care of her and you are my duty for life”.

[21] Ms. Han’s expectation was that the parties would live together in the future. She says they planned to live together. Those plans evolved over time. Initially they involved purchasing a property in Toronto, so that Mr. Dorje could visit when he was in New York. They also discussed purchasing property in Calgary or renting a home in Vancouver for that purpose. Ms. Han eventually purchased a condominium in Richmond using funds provided by Mr. Dorje.

[22] Ms. Han deposes that the parties made plans for Mr. Dorje to visit her and meet the child in Richmond. In October 2018, however, Mr. Dorje wrote that he needed to “disappear” to Europe. He wrote:

I will definitely find a way to meet her

And you

Remember to take care of yourself if something happens

[23] The final plan the parties discussed, according to Ms. Han, was that Mr. Dorje would sponsor Ms. Han and the child to immigrate to the United States and live at the Kagyu retreat centre in New York State.

[24] In January 2019, Ms. Han lost contact with Mr. Dorje.

[25] Ms. Han commenced this family law case on July 17, 2019, seeking child support, a declaration of parentage and a parentage test. She did not seek spousal support.

[26] Ms. Han first proposed a claim for spousal support in October 2020 after a change in her counsel. Following an exchange of correspondence concerning an application for leave to amend the notice of family claim, Ms. Han’s counsel wrote that Ms. Han would not be advancing a spousal support claim. On March 16, 2020, counsel reversed course, and advised that Ms. Han had instructed him to proceed with the application.

[27] When this application came on before me, the trial was set to commence on June 7, 2021. The parties were still in the process of discoveries and obtaining translations for hundreds of pages of documents in Chinese characters.

[28] At a trial management conference on May 6, 2021, noting the parties were not ready to proceed, Madam Justice Walkem adjourned the trial to April 11, 2022.

ANALYSIS
A. The Spousal Support Claim in this Case
[29] To claim spousal support in this case, Ms. Han must plead that she lived with Mr. Dorje in a marriage-like relationship. This is because only “spouses” are entitled to spousal support, and s. 3 of the Family Law Act defines a spouse as a person who is married or has lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship:

3 (1) A person is a spouse for the purposes of this Act if the person

(a) is married to another person, or

(b) has lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship, and

(i) has done so for a continuous period of at least 2 years, or

(ii) except in Parts 5 [Property Division] and 6 [Pension Division], has a child with the other person.

[30] Because she alleges she has a child with Mr. Dorje, Ms. Han need not allege that the relationship endured for a continuous period of two years to claim spousal support; but she must allege that she lived in a marriage-like relationship with him at some point in time. Accordingly, she must amend the notice of family claim.

B. The Test to Amend Pleadings
[31] Given that the notice of trial has been served, Ms. Han requires leave of the court to amend the notice of family claim: Supreme Court Family Rule 8-1(1)(b)(i).

[32] A person seeking to amend a notice of family claim must show that there is a reasonable cause of action. This is a low threshold. What the applicant needs to establish is that, if the facts pleaded are proven at trial, they would support a reasonable claim. The applicant’s allegations of fact are assumed to be true for the purposes of this analysis. Cantelon v. Wall, 2015 BCSC 813, at para. 7-8.

[33] The applicant’s delay, the reasons for the delay, and the prejudice to the responding party are also relevant factors. The ultimate consideration is whether it would be just and convenient to allow the amendment. Cantelon, at para. 6, citing Teal Cedar Products Ltd. v. Dale Intermediaries Ltd. et al (1986), 19 B.C.L.R. (3d) 282.

C. Pleadings in Family Law Cases
[34] Supreme Court Family Rules 3-1(1) and 4-1(1) require that a claim to spousal support be pleaded in a notice of family claim in Form F3. Section 2 of Form F3, “Spousal relationship history”, requires a spousal support claimant to check the boxes that apply to them, according to whether they are or have been married or are or have been in a marriage-like relationship. Where a claimant alleges a marriage-like relationship, Form F3 requires that they provide the date on which they began to live together with the respondent in a marriage-like relationship and, where applicable, the date on which they separated. Form F3 does not require a statement of the factual basis for the claim of spousal support.

[35] In this case, Ms. Han seeks to amend the notice of family claim to allege that she and Mr. Dorje began to live in a marriage-like relationship in or around January 2018, and separated in or around January 2019.

[36] An allegation that a person lived with a claimant in a marriage-like relationship is a conclusion of law, not an allegation of fact. Unlike the rules governing pleadings in civil actions, however, the Supreme Court Family Rules do not expressly require family law claimants to plead the material facts in support of conclusions of law.

[37] In other words, there is no express requirement in the Supreme Court Family Rules that Ms. Han plead the facts on which she relies for the allegation she and Mr. Dorje lived in a marriage-like relationship.

[38] Rule 4-6 authorizes a party to demand particulars, and then apply to the court for an order for further and better particulars, of a matter stated in a pleading. However, unless and until she is granted leave and files the proposed amended notice of family claim, Ms. Han’s allegation of a marriage-like relationship is not a matter stated in a pleading.

[39] Ms. Han filed an affidavit in support of her application to amend the notice of family claim. Normally, evidence would not be required or admissible on an application to amend a pleading. However, in the unusual circumstances of this case, the parties agreed I may look to Ms. Han’s affidavit and exhibits for the facts she pleads in support of the allegation of a marriage-like relationship.

[40] Because this is an application to amend - and Ms. Han’s allegations of fact are presumed to be true - I have not considered Mr. Dorje’s responding affidavit.

[41] Relying on affidavit evidence for an application to amend pleadings is less than ideal. It tends to merge and confuse the material facts with the evidence that would be relied on to prove those facts. In a number of places in her affidavit, for example, Ms. Han describes her feelings, impressions and understandings. A person’s hopes and intentions are not normally material facts unless they are mutual or reasonably held. The facts on which Ms. Han alleges she and Mr. Dorje formed a marriage-like relationship are more important for the present purposes than her belief they entered into a conjugal union.

[42] Somewhat unusually, in this case, almost all of the parties’ relevant communications were in writing. This makes it somewhat easier to separate the facts from the evidence; however, as stated above, it is difficult to understand the intentions and actions of a person from brief text messages.

[43] In my view, it would be a good practice for applicants who seek to amend their pleadings in family law cases to provide opposing counsel and the court with a schedule of the material facts on which they rely for the proposed amendment.

D. The Legal Concept of a Marriage-Like Relationship
[44] As Mr. Justice Myers observed in Mother 1 v. Solus Trust Company, 2019 BCSC 200, the concept of a marriage-like relationship is elastic and difficult to define. This elasticity is illustrated by the following passage from Yakiwchuk v. Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124, quoted by Myers J. at para. 133 of Mother 1:

[10] Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal relationships, whether they are married or not, structure their relationships differently. In some relationships there is a complete blending of finances and property - in others, spouses keep their property and finances totally separate and in still others one spouse may totally control those aspects of the relationship with the other spouse having little or no knowledge or input. For some couples, sexual relations are very important - for others, that aspect may take a back seat to companionship. Some spouses do not share the same bed. There may be a variety of reasons for this such as health or personal choice. Some people are affectionate and demonstrative. They show their feelings for their “spouse” by holding hands, touching and kissing in public. Other individuals are not demonstrative and do not engage in public displays of affection. Some “spouses” do everything together - others do nothing together. Some “spouses” vacation together and some spend their holidays apart. Some “spouses” have children - others do not. It is this variation in the way human beings structure their relationships that make the determination of when a “spousal relationship” exists difficult to determine. With married couples, the relationship is easy to establish. The marriage ceremony is a public declaration of their commitment and intent. Relationships outside marriage are much more difficult to ascertain. Rarely is there any type of “public” declaration of intent. Often people begin cohabiting with little forethought or planning. Their motivation is often nothing more than wanting to “be together”. Some individuals have chosen to enter relationships outside marriage because they did not want the legal obligations imposed by that status. Some individuals have simply given no thought as to how their relationship would operate. Often the date when the cohabitation actually began is blurred because people “ease into” situations, spending more and more time together. Agreements between people verifying when their relationship began and how it will operate often do not exist.

[45] In Mother 1, Mr. Justice Myers referred to a list of 22 factors grouped into seven categories, from Maldowich v. Penttinen, (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), that have frequently been cited in this and other courts for the purpose of determining whether a relationship was marriage-like, at para. 134 of Mother 1:

1. Shelter:

(a) Did the parties live under the same roof?

(b) What were the sleeping arrangements?

(c) Did anyone else occupy or share the available accommodation?

2. Sexual and Personal Behaviour:

(a) Did the parties have sexual relations? If not, why not?

(b) Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other?

(c) What were their feelings toward each other?

(d) Did they communicate on a personal level?

(e) Did they eat their meals together?

(f) What, if anything, did they do to assist each other with problems or during illness?

(g) Did they buy gifts for each other on special occasions?

3. Services:

What was the conduct and habit of the parties in relation to:

(a) preparation of meals;

(b) washing and mending clothes;

(c) shopping;

(d) household maintenance; and

(e) any other domestic services?

4. Social:

(a) Did they participate together or separately in neighbourhood and community activities?

(b) What was the relationship and conduct of each of them toward members of their respective families and how did such families behave towards the parties?

5. Societal:

What was the attitude and conduct of the community toward each of them and as a couple?

6. Support (economic):

(a) What were the financial arrangements between the parties regarding the provision of or contribution toward the necessaries of life (food, clothing, shelter, recreation, etc.)?

(b) What were the arrangements concerning the acquisition and ownership of property?

(c) Was there any special financial arrangement between them which both agreed would be determinant of their overall relationship?

7. Children:

What was the attitude and conduct of the parties concerning children?

[46] In Austin v. Goerz, 2007 BCCA 586, the Court of Appeal cautioned against a “checklist approach”; rather, a court should "holistically" examine all the relevant factors. Cases like Molodowich provide helpful indicators of the sorts of behaviour that society associates with a marital relationship, the Court of Appeal said; however, “the presence or absence of any particular factor cannot be determinative of whether a relationship is marriage-like” (para. 58).

[47] In Weber v. Leclerc, 2015 BCCA 492, the Court of Appeal again affirmed that there is no checklist of characteristics that will be found in all marriages and then concluded with respect to evidence of intentions:

[23] The parties’ intentions – particularly the expectation that the relationship will be of lengthy, indeterminate duration – may be of importance in determining whether a relationship is “marriage-like”. While the court will consider the evidence expressly describing the parties’ intentions during the relationship, it will also test that evidence by considering whether the objective evidence is consonant with those intentions.

[24] The question of whether a relationship is “marriage-like” will also typically depend on more than just their intentions. Objective evidence of the parties’ lifestyle and interactions will also provide direct guidance on the question of whether the relationship was “marriage-like”.

[48] Significantly for this case, the courts have looked to mutual intent in order to find a marriage-like relationship. See, for example, L.E. v. D.J., 2011 BCSC 671 and Buell v. Unger, 2011 BCSC 35; Davey Estate v. Gruyaert, 2005 CarswellBC 3456 at 13 and 35.

[49] In Mother 1, Myers J. concluded his analysis of the law with the following learned comment:

[143] Having canvassed the law relating to the nature of a marriage-like relationship, I will digress to point out the problematic nature of the concept. It may be apparent from the above that determining whether a marriage-like relationship exists sometimes seems like sand running through one's fingers. Simply put, a marriage-like relationship is akin to a marriage without the formality of a marriage. But as the cases mentioned above have noted, people treat their marriages differently and have different conceptions of what marriage entails.

[50] In short, the determination of whether the parties in this case lived in a marriage-like relationship is a fact-specific inquiry that a trial judge would need to make on a “holistic” basis, having regard to all of the evidence. While the trial judge may consider the various factors listed in the authorities, those factors would not be treated as a checklist and no single factor or category of factors would be treated as being decisive.

E. Is There a Reasonable Claim of a Marriage-Like Relationship?
[51] In this case, many of the Molodowich factors are missing:

a) The parties never lived under the same roof. They never slept together. They were never in the same place at the same time during the relationship. The last time they saw each other in person was in November 2017, before the relationship began.

b) The parties never had consensual sex. They did not hug, kiss or hold hands. With the exception of the alleged sexual assault, they never touched one another physically.

c) The parties expressed care and affection for one another, but they rarely shared personal information or interest in their lives outside of their direct topic of communication. They did not write about their families, their friends, their religious beliefs or their work.

d) They expressed concern and support for one another when the other felt unwell or experienced health issues, but they did not provide any care or assistance during illness or other problems.

e) They did not assist one another with domestic chores.

f) They did not share their relationship with their peers or their community. There is no allegation, for example, that Mr. Dorje told his fellow monks or any of his followers about the relationship. There is no allegation that Ms. Han told her friends or any co-workers. Indeed, there is no allegation that anyone, with the exception of Ms. Han’s mother, knew about the relationship. Although Mr. Dorje gave Ms. Han’s mother a gift, he never met the mother and he never spoke to her.

g) They did not intend to have a child together. The child was conceived as a result of a sexual assault. While Mr. Dorje expressed interest in “meeting” the child, he never followed up. He currently has no relationship with the child. There is no allegation he has sought access or parenting arrangements.

[52] The only Molodowich factor of any real relevance in this case is economic support. Mr. Dorje provided the funds with which Ms. Han purchased a condominium. Mr. Dorje initially wrote that he wanted to buy a property with the money, but, he wrote, “It’s the same thing if you buy [it]”.

[53] Mr. Dorje also provided a significant amount of money for Ms. Han’s postpartum care and the child’s first year of life.

[54] This financial support may have been primarily for the benefit of the child. Even the condominium, Ms. Han wrote, was primarily for the benefit of the child.

[55] However, in my view, a trial judge may attach a broader significance to the financial support from Mr. Dorje than child support alone. A trial judge may find that the money Mr. Dorje provided to Ms. Han at her request was an expression of his commitment to her in circumstances in which he could not commit physically. The money and the gifts may be seen by the trial judge to have been a form of down payment by Mr. Dorje on a promise of continued emotional and financial support for Ms. Han, or, in Mr. Dorje’s own words, “Taking care of her and you are my duty for life” (emphasis added).

[56] On the other hand, I find it difficult to attach any particular significance to the fact that Mr. Dorje agreed to provide funds for Ms. Han to purchase a wedding ring. It appears to me that Ms. Han demanded that Mr. Dorje buy her a wedding ring, not that the ring had any mutual meaning to the parties as a marriage symbol. But it is relevant, in my view, that Mr. Dorje provided $20,000 USD to Ms. Han for something she wanted that was of no benefit to the child.

[57] Further, Ms. Han alleges that the parties intended to live together. At a minimum, a trial judge may find that the discussions about where Ms. Han and the child would live reflected a mutual intention of the parties to see one another and spend time together when they could.

[58] Mr. Dorje argues that an intention to live together at some point in the future is not sufficient to show that an existing relationship was marriage-like. He argues that the question of whether the relationship was marriage-like requires more than just intentions, citing Weber, supra.

[59] In my view, the documentary evidence referred to above provides some objective evidence in this case that the parties progressed beyond mere intentions. As stated, the parties appear to have expressed genuine care and affection for one another. They appear to have discussed marriage, trust, honesty, finances, mutual obligations and acquiring family property. These are not matters one would expect Mr. Dorje to discuss with a friend or a follower, or even with the mother of his child, without a marriage-like element of the relationship.

[60] A trial judge may find on the facts alleged by Ms. Han that the parties loved one another and would have lived together, but were unable to do so because of Mr. Dorje’s religious duties and nomadic lifestyle.

[61] The question I raised in the introduction to these reasons is whether a relationship that began on-line and never moved into the physical world can be marriage-like.

[62] Notably, the definition of a spouse in the Family Law Act does not require that the parties live together, only that they live with another person in a marriage-like relationship.

[63] In Connor Estate, 2017 BCSC 978, Mr. Justice Kent found that a couple that maintained two entirely separate households and never lived under the same roof formed a marriage-like relationship. (Connor Estate was decided under the intestacy provisions of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c. 13 ("WESA"), but courts have relied on cases decided under WESA and the FLA interchangeably for their definitions of a spouse.) Mr. Justice Kent found:

[50] The evidence is overwhelming and I find as a fact that Mr. Chambers and Ms. Connor loved and cared deeply about each other, and that they had a loving and intimate relationship for over 20 years that was far more than mere friendship or even so-called "friendship with benefits". I accept Mr. Chambers' evidence that he would have liked to share a home with Ms. Connor after the separation from his wife, but was unable to do so because of Ms. Connor's hoarding illness. The evidence amply supports, and I find as a fact, that Mr. Chambers and Ms. Connor loved each other, were faithful to each other, communicated with each other almost every day when they were not together, considered themselves to be (and presented themselves to be) "husband and wife" and were accepted by all who knew them as a couple.

[64] Connor Estate may be distinguishable from this case because Mr. Chambers and Ms. Connor were physically intimate for over 20 years, and presented themselves to the world as a married couple.

[65] Other decisions in which a marriage-like relationship has been found to exist despite the parties not living together have involved circumstances in which the couple lived under the same roof at previous points in the relationship, and the issue was whether they continued to be spouses after they took up separate residences: in Thompson v. Floyd, 2001 BCCA 78, the parties had lived together for a period of at least 11 years; in Roach v. Dutra, 2010 BCCA 264, the parties had lived together for approximately three years.

[66] However, as Mr. Justice Kent noted in Connor Estate:

[48] … [W]hile much guidance might be found in this case law, the simple fact is that no two cases are identical (and indeed they usually vary widely) and it is the assessment of evidence as a whole in this particular case which matters.

[67] Mr. Justice Kent concluded:

[53] Like human beings themselves, marriage-like relationships can come in many and various shapes. In this particular case, I have no doubt that such a relationship existed …

[68] As stated, Ms. Han’s claim is novel. It may even be weak. Almost all of the traditional factors are missing. The fact that Ms. Han and Mr. Dorje never lived under the same roof, never shared a bed and never even spent time together in person will militate against a finding they lived with one another in a marriage-like relationship. However, the traditional factors are not a mandatory check-list that confines the “elastic” concept of a marriage-like relationship. And if the COVID pandemic has taught us nothing else, it is that real relationships can form, blossom and end in virtual worlds.

[69] In my view, the merits of Ms. Han’s claim should be decided on the evidence. Subject to an overriding prejudice to Mr. Dorje, she should have leave to amend the notice of family claim. However, she should also provide meaningful particulars of the alleged marriage-like relationship.

F. Delay / Prejudice
[70] Ms. Han filed her notice of family claim on July 17, 2019. She brought this application to amend approximately one year and nine months after she filed the pleading, just over two months before the original trial date.

[71] Ms. Han’s delay was made all that more remarkable by her change in position from January 19, 2021, when she confirmed, through counsel, that she was not seeking spousal support in this case.

[72] Ms. Han gave notice of her intention to proceed with this application to Mr. Dorje on March 16, 2021. By the time the application was heard, the parties had conducted examinations for discovery without covering the issues that would arise from a claim of spousal support.

[73] Also, in April, Ms. Han produced additional documents, primarily text messages, that may be relevant to her claim of spousal support, but were undecipherable to counsel for Mr. Dorje, who does not read Mandarin.

[74] This application proceeded largely on documents selected and translated by counsel for Ms. Han. I was informed that Mandarin translations of the full materials would take 150 days.

[75] Understandably in the circumstances, Mr. Dorje argued that an amendment two months before trial would be neither just nor convenient. He argued that he would be prejudiced by an adjournment so as to allow Ms. Han to advance a late claim of spousal support.

[76] The circumstances changed on May 6, 2021, when Madam Justice Walkem adjourned the trial to July 2022 and reset it for 25 days. Madam Justice Walkem noted that most of the witnesses live internationally and require translators. She also noted that paternity may be in issue, and Mr. Dorje may amend his pleadings to raise that issue. It seems clear that, altogether apart from the potential spousal support claim, the parties were not ready to proceed to trial on June 7, 2021.

[77] In my view, any remaining prejudice to Mr. Dorje is outweighed by the importance of having all of the issues between the parties decided on their merits.

[78] Ms. Han’s delay and changes of position on spousal support may be a matter to de addressed in a future order of costs; but they are not grounds on which to deny her leave to amend the notice of family claim.

CONCLUSION
[79] Ms. Han is granted leave to amend her notice of family claim in the form attached as Appendix A to the notice of application to include a claim for spousal support.

[80] Within 21 days, or such other deadline as the parties may agree, Ms. Han must provide particulars of the marriage-like relationship alleged in the amended notice of family claim.

[81] Ms. Han is entitled to costs of this application in the cause of the spousal support claim.

“Master Elwood”

（轉）

【有關司法機構被官營媒體攻擊的聲明】

《人民日報》於2020年12月27日發表一篇抨擊香港法院在一宗涉及知名人士的案件中批准被告人保釋的評論文章，而文章發表的時候該獲准保釋的決定已進入上訴程序，我們就此表示嚴重關注。文章攻擊法院的判決，並形容《蘋果日報》創辦人黎智英「惡名昭彰，極度危險」，以及是「亂港禍首」。該報斷言在黎智英案中，不准保釋須是前設的常規，並要求司法機構「作出正確選擇」。文章又認為已經有足夠證據顯示黎智英已觸犯國安法第55條，該條訂明某些案件可以移交中國大陸審訊。當上訴委員會將於2020年12月31日就政府申請上訴許可召開聆訊，由國家政權控制和營運的報章刊登該篇評論文章，令人尤其擔心及被視為是試圖干預我們獨立的司法機關的程序公義。

作為致力守護長久以來珍而重之的法治和司法獨立的法律執業者，我們認為有責任提出以下關注，並以個人名義僅此聲明：

1、 官營媒體對司法機關毫無基礎的攻擊應當停止

在數位親建制人士及官方控制和營運的媒體 － 包括《文匯報》及《大公報》－ 要求「司法改革」及嘲諷「黃官」的日益壓力下，出現上述評論文章，我們深表憂慮。我們注意到司法機構自今年9月以來，已就對其日趨激烈的攻擊發表了四份聲明。

誠然，公眾有權討論及評論法院的裁決及其根據的事實及法律，惟討論不應流於憑空論斷、政治抹黑，或企圖向法院就某些案件的裁決施加壓力，否則公眾對司法機構的聲譽、專業和獨立勢必受到嚴重破壞。特別是《人民日報》刊登的評論文章，會被視為明顯地向法院將要審理的案件施加壓力，此舉可以是違反審理中的案件不應評論的原則，以及有損公平審訊。這些攻擊應當立即停止。

我們亦呼籲律政司採取行動，維護司法機構免受官方控制或營運的媒體作出毫無基礎和不實指控。正如高浩文法官在其判詞中指出，「在普通法司法管轄區，例如香港，傳統上法官和司法機構是不會公開地就針對其裁決和個人而作出的不公平和不適當的批評為自己辯護，而傳統上負責律政的官員則有責任反駁錯誤的指控，以維護司法機構和個別法官。」

2、 公平審訊及無罪假定

不論如何解讀，香港特區政府有法律責任保護每一位香港居民的基本權利不受侵犯，包括公平審訊的權利。我們質疑一旦涉嫌觸犯國安法第55條下，該等權利是否仍然受到保障。理由有兩方面：第一，我們質疑中國大陸在刑事審訊的程序中，對公平審訊是否有足夠的保障，那是由於中國尚未落實《公民與政治權利國際公約》，這亦是長久以來為人詬病。第二，12名香港居民於2020年12月28日在深圳鹽田法院受審的案件，沒有公開審訊，他們亦沒有權選擇他們委託的法律代表，令人質疑香港特區政府有否履行其法律責任。

上述關注，反映國安法無法為被告人提供足夠的基本人權保障，並在法律上存在很多不確定性。正如英國最高法院院長賓漢（Lord Bingham）在其著作《The Rule of Law》中說明，法治的核心是在一個地方裡，所有不論屬公共或私人的個人和機構，都必須受法律的約束及保障，而法律必須是公開和預先頒佈，以及由法院公開執行。因此，我們促請有關當局嚴格遵守法治原則，自我約束，以及謹慎運用國安法賦予的權力。

帝理邁
林洋鋐
彭皓昕
蔡頴德
黃耀初

2020年12月30日


【Statement on Continuous Attacks on the Judiciary and
Art. 55 of the National Security Law】

We note with grave concern that on 27 December 2020, l the People’s Daily published anr editorial piece criticizing a decision in respect of a bail application that is currently subject to an ongoing appeal. In attacking the judicial decisions in Apple Daily founder, Mr Jimmy Lai Chee-yin’s case, the People’s Daily has labelled him as a “notorious and extremely dangerous” and an “insurgent”. It added that the presumption against bail should be the norm in cases such as Lai’s and urged the judiciary to “make the right decision”. The commentary further claimed that there were sufficient grounds in Mr Lai’s case for invoking Article 55 of the National Security Law (NSL) - which allows certain cases to be transferred to Mainland China for trial. This type of commentary appearing in a newspaper run/controlled by the Central Government, when the Appeals Committee would soon be hearing the Hong Kong Government’s application for leave to appeal on 31 December 2020, is particularly worrying and borders on an attempt to interfere with the due administration of justice by Hong Kong’s independent judiciary.

We, the undersigned, in our personal capacity and as lawyers committed to safeguarding the Rule of Law and the independence of judiciary, we feel duty bound to draw attention to the following matters:

(1) Unfounded attacks against the judiciary by state-run/controlled media should cease

The above-mentioned commentary was made amid intensifying calls for “judicial reform” and deriding “yellow judges” from various pro-establishment figures and state-run/controlled media, including Wen Wei Po and Tai Kung Po. To that end, we note that the judiciary has had to issue a total of four statements since September this year, in light of the intensifying attacks mounted against it.

Whilst members of the public have the right to discuss and comment on court rulings for reasons grounded on fact or law, such discussion should not cross into bare assertions, imputations of political bias, or attempts to put pressure on the Judiciary to decide specific cases in a particular manner. Otherwise, public confidence in the integrity, professionalism and independence of the judiciary would be seriously undermined. Notably, the commentary published by People’s Daily, could be perceived as putting pressure on the judiciary to decide a pending case in a particular manner, which breaches the sub judice rule and could prejudice the accused’s right to a fair trial. These attacks should cease immediately.

We also call on the Secretary of Justice to take action to defend the Judiciary against unwarranted accusations led by state-run/controlled media. As Judge Russell Coleman noted in his judgment, “it has been the traditional view that Judges and the Judiciary do not speak out in defence of their decisions or to defend themselves against unfair and inappropriate criticism [...] in common law jurisdictions like Hong Kong, it was the tradition that the minister responsible for the administration of justice has the duty of defending the Judiciary or individual Judges against wrong accusations”.

(2) Concerns about fair trial and presumption of innocence

The Hong Kong Government has the legal obligation to protect any Hong Kong residents, whose rendition is sought, from violation of his/her fundamental and non-derogable rights, including the right to fair trial. We question whether such rights can be guaranteed upon invoking of Article 55 of the NSL. The reason is two-folded. First, we question whether China has adequate protection on the right to fair trial during the criminal process, as mainland China has not ratified the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and has been long criticised on such. Second, the fact that the 12 Hong Kong residents who stood trial at Shenzhen Yantian People’s Court on 28 December 2020 were denied the right to open trial and the right to appoint lawyers of their choice, casts considerable doubt on whether the Hong Kong Government can fulfil its legal obligation.

These concerns reflect that the NSL lacks adequate protections to safeguard an accused’s fundamental human rights and lacks legal certainty. As Lord Bingham wrote in his book, The Rule of Law, at the core of the rule of law is the notion “that all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly administered in the courts”. Accordingly, we urge the authorities to uphold strict adherence to the rule of law and exercise restraint and caution in invoking its power under the NSL.
Mark Daly
Michelle Tsoi Wing Tak
Kenneth Lam
Davyd Wong
Janet Pang Ho Yan

Dated this 30 December 2020

?ASPIRE ZERO G 40W 1500mAh?
(INTRODUCTION)
Aspire Zero G is designed by Noname, made by Aspire. Following the successful launch of Paradox and the 9th tank, the third product produced by their collaboration. Featuring a mechanical wattage adjuster beautifully finished colors and a robust, high-end style the Zero G is truly a marvel in pod system vaping. The Zero G mod main frame design is made of stainless steel, with black liquid silicone rubber, it provides a comfortable grip and is non-slip and durable, the perfect balance of quality and comfort. Aspire Zero G is equipped with a 1500mAh built-in battery, which provides a USB Type-C port for reliable and stable charging. The Aspire Zero G uses an aspire self-developed ASP chipset, which comes with the overall protection for safe use. Zero G provides 5-40W wattage adjustment, using a unique retro bottom mechanical wattage adjuster for the setting.
Aspire Zero G pod has a 3.5ml e-juice capacity and utilizes the bottom filling system. Fully compatible with AVP Pro coils, the Zero G has instant out of the box appeal, however, the true value in this product is the (included) RBA deck, meaning you can tailor make your vape to your own needs, without the added expense of buying adapters. Airflow control assists both MTL and Sub-ohm channels and choices available to all users. Easily transfer from MTL or Restricted DTL vaping. The Zero G delivers maximum flavor and performance.

(FEATURES)
• 304 Stainless Steel/Black Liquid Silicone Rubber Body
• 1500mAh Internal Battery
• 1A Type-C Charging Facility
• 5-40W Wattage Range
• Mechanical Adjustable Wattage
• 0.1 - 3.5ohm Resistance Range
• RBA Deck Included Within
• 3.5ml E-juice Capacity
• Easy Bottom Fill 
• 510 Drip Tip
• Magnetic Pod Connection
• MTL and restricted DTL vaping
• ASP Chipset Safety Protection

(SPECIFICATIONS)
Mod Dimension: H80.8mm x φ26.2mm
Body Material: 304 stainless steel with liquid silicone rubber
Battery: Built-in Li-po 1500mAh battery
Wattage Output: 5-40W
Mod Supported Resistance Range: 0.1-3.5ohm
Pod Dimension: H28.7 x φ26.2mm (without coil, with drip tip)
Pod Material: 304 stainless steel and PEI
Pod Capacity: 3.5ml
Filling Type: Bottom filling
Airflow: Bottom adjustable airflow
Coil Resistance: 0.65ohm Mesh Coil (15-18W), 1.15ohm Standard Coil (10-16W)
Coil Compatibility: AVP Pro Coils
Colors: Stainless Steel, Black
#ASPIREZEROG #PJAVAPORIZER #DOTSTICKKILLER
__________________________________________________________________________
?SAY NO TO UNDERAGE?
DISCLAIMER: Vape or electronic cigarette is strictly not suitable for kids under 18. All Vaping reviews will be set to age restriction. This review is for adult smokers trying to get better health for quit smoking. For adult vapers to update about new products and tutorial. Vape safe and be happy gais! ☺️

Review/Branding/Sponsors/ job enquiries please email: adrianlodejavu@gmail.com

♠︎MAIN SPONSOR♠︎
?VAPX
?SNOW WOLF
?WERTI
?PJA VAPORIZER
?ARTERY VAPOR
?HEAVENGIFTS

SOCIAL VAPING:
?YOUTUBE: http://www.youtube.com/adrianlodejavu
?INSTAGRAM: http://www.instagram.com/adrianlodejavu/
?FACEBOOK: http://www.facebook.com/adrianlodejavu/
?[DJV] DEJAVU: http://www.instagram.com/official.djv/

SOCIAL CAR PROJECT:
?INSTAGRAM: http://www.instagram.com/wishlistproject_malaysia/
?FACEBOOK: http://www.facebook.com/wishlistproject_malaysia/
?PLAYLIST: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLXpdca_pLp7p6lXZi9OXYSbmsu7BpzogY

? หลายๆคนคงได้เห็นข่าวไฟป่าครั้งใหญ่ที่ออสเตรเลียกันแล้ว ไฟลุกไหม้มากว่า 4 เดือน สร้างความเสียหายกว่า 8,000 ล้านบาท มีผู้เสียชีวิต 24 ราย สัตว์ป่าเกือบ 500 ล้านตัว และโคอาลากว่า 8,000 ชีวิต　
　
? เพราะเราอยู่ร่วมกันเพื่อเกื้อกูล ในความสูญเสียครั้งนี้ ด้วยกำลังของเรา เราสามารถช่วยเพื่อนมนุษย์และสัตว์ใหญ่น้อยได้ทางลิงค์ต่างๆด้านล่างนะคะ
　
#PrayForAustralia #GiveHelp #GiveLove
　
　
　
? ช่องทางช่วยเหลือ　
　
? ร่วมบริจาคเงินช่วยเหลือทีมอพยพและฟื้นฟู ได้ที่
Australian Red Cross
https://www.redcross.org.au/campaigns/disaster-relief-and-recovery-donate 　
　
? ที่พักพิงและอาหารสำหรับผู้ประสบภัยและทีมต่อสู้สาธารณภัย
Salvation Army Australia
https://www.salvationarmy.org.au/donate/make-a-donation/donate-online/?appeal=disasterappeal 　
　
? อาหาร เสื้อผ้า และการสร้างบ้านใหม่ ของครอบครัวผู้ประสบภัย
St. Vincent de Paul Society Australia
https://donate.vinnies.org.au/appeals-nsw/vinnies-nsw-bushfire-appeal-nsw 　
　
? นักผจญเพลิงและครอบครัว
The Country Fire Service in South Australia
https://cfsfoundation.org.au/donate 　
　
The New South Wales Rural Fire Service
https://www.rfs.nsw.gov.au/volunteer/support-your-local-brigade 　
　
The Victorian Bushfire Appeal
https://www.vic.gov.au/bushfireappeal 　
　
? ช่วยเหลือสัตว์ป่าที่บาดเจ็บฉุกเฉิน
WIRES, an Australian wildlife rescue nonprofit
https://www.wires.org.au/ 　
　
Currumbin Wildlife Hospital
https://www.gofundme.com/f/save-our-koala-bushfire-victims 　
　
? อุปถัมภ์ค่าเลี้ยงดูโคอาลา
Port Macquarie Koala Hospital
https://www.koalahospital.org.au/product-category/adoptions 　
　
---　
? ที่มา　
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/03/us/how-to-help-australia-bushfire-victims-iyw-trnd/index.html
https://www.cnet.com/how-to/australian-fires-everything-we-know-and-how-you-can-help

New Honda Motorcycles at 45th Tokyo Motor Show 2017

Honda Riding Assist-e:
The Honda Riding Assist-e is an experimental motorcycle model Honda developed by applying proprietary balance control technologies Honda amassed through its research in the field of robotics. Honda’s aim for this model is to offer motorcycle riders greater peace of mind and make life with motorcycles more fun for people by mitigating the risk of a fall.

Neo Sports Café Concept:
Honda exhibited the world premiere of the Neo Sports Café Concept, which is a concept model for a naked sport model that combines the fun and beauty of a sport bike with a new-generation motorcycle package.

Super Cub 110, a commemorative model recognizing the 100 million-unit milestone:
The Super Cub 110 is a special model Honda produced exclusively for the Tokyo Motor Show to commemorate the achievement of the 100 million-unit global production milestone this year and the 60th anniversary next year for the Super Cub series.

Super Cub C125:
The Super Cub C125 inherited and evolved the attractive design and functionality as a personal commuter from the first-generation Super Cub (C100). This new 125cc model features the latest equipment such as a smart key and electric seat opener and yet realizes ample power for a comfortable riding experience.

Monkey 125:
A 125cc horizontal, single-cylinder engine was installed to the signature body of the Honda Monkey with a sense of intentional deformation which comes from the short & tall body proportion unique to the Monkey series. Adopting unique features such as LED lights and digital meters, the Monkey 125 explores the new appeal of the Honda Monkey model.

GOLD WING TOUR / GOLD WING:
Honda exhibited the Japan premiere of the Honda Gold Wing grand touring model, which has been evolving as a flagship motorcycle model of Honda, and will underwent a full model change. The all-new Gold Wing features new technologies including a newly-developed horizontally-opposed 6-cylinder engine, 7-speed DCT and Honda’s original double wishbone suspension. The Gold Wing is planned to go on sale through Honda’s new “Honda Dream” sales channel to be launched in April 2018.

PCX ELECTRIC:
The PCX Electric is an electric scooter equipped with a high-output motor developed independently by Honda as well as the Honda Mobile Power Pack, a detachable mobile battery pack. Honda PCX Electric is scheduled to go on sale in 2018 in the Asia region including Japan.

PCX HYBRID:
Honda newly-developed an original hybrid system designed for motorcycles. This compact hybrid system employs a high-output battery and ACG starter to assist the engine and enables PCX Hybrid to realize a “torqueful” riding performance. Honda PCX Hybrid is scheduled to go on sale in 2018 in the Asia region including Japan.

CROSS CUB 110:
Featuring a crossover style which will look good for both urban area riding and outdoor activities, the Cross Cub 110 proposes a new value of Honda Cub motorcycles. As a model oriented toward recreational use, the “tough” image is being emphasized with the adoption of a leg shield and wider tires.